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    題名: 中央政府的委託決策及地方政府競爭
    Delegate-Decision of central government and competition among local governments
    作者: 林玉玫
    貢獻者: 王智賢
    林玉玫
    關鍵詞: 委託
    競租
    日期: 2011
    上傳時間: 2012-10-30 11:32:34 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文除了以公共選擇理論為分析基礎外，亦將民意取向納入考量，探討當中央政府在考量本身相關收入及消費者福利下，透過不同的委託方式，將某一財貨提供權下放予地方政府時，對地方政府競爭及消費者福利的影響。結果顯示：委託方式不會影響地方政府不誠實的行為決策。此外亦存在著中央政府與消費者偏好一致的決策空間。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    98255028
    100
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098255028
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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