政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/54310
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113392/144379 (79%)
Visitors : 51212709      Online Users : 887
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54310


    Title: 政治關係與所有權結構對公司價值的影響
    The Impacts of Political Connections and Ownership Structure on Firm Value
    Authors: 王佑鈞
    Wang, Yu Chun
    Contributors: 朱浩民
    沈中華
    Chu, Hau Min
    Shen, Chung Hua
    王佑鈞
    Wang, Yu Chun
    Keywords: 政治關係
    文獻回顧
    投資人交易
    公司價值
    所有權結構
    political connections
    survey
    investor trading
    firm value
    ownership structure
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 10:42:21 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This dissertation discusses three issues. First, we provide a thorough survey of political connections in the essay “A Survey of Political Connection Literature.” Then two empirical studies on political connections are presented in the following two essays, “Do Political Preferences Affect Investor Trading Behavior and Market Reaction?” and “The Relationship between Ownership Structure and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from the Taiwanese Presidential Election and Global Financial Crisis of 2008,” respectively. Last, we present the conclusions in the final chapter.
    From the survey in the first essay, the impacts of political connections on firm value and corporate finance issues are discussed. A number of recent studies have found that political connections create value for firms when these connections are considered beneficial. Thus, in the second essay, we are motivated to investigate what kind of stock market investors would take such advantages that increase the value of their portfolio. We are also motivated by the argument in the literature that the officials’ rent-seeking behavior to establish political connections may bear some costs for the firms. Then, in the third essay, we address the question whether the value of political connections is associated with the firms’ managerial ownership structure. We organize our three essays into Chapters 2 to 4, respectively, and we briefly describe these issues below.
    Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and empirical background of this dissertation. We survey extant research on political connections, with special attention to its importance on corporate finance. First we discuss whether and how political connections affect firm value. Then we turn to the channel through which political connections affect firm value. For instance, political connections help firms obtain more external funds with lower costs, which results in a decline in the required rate of return and an increase in the market value. Studies that discuss the characteristics of politically connected firms are also surveyed in this essay.
    In Chapter 3, the essay discusses whether or not political preferences bring value to a firm. We approach the issue by checking the share trading and stock returns of politically connected firms during the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election. In particular, we classify investors into sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors. The political preference hypothesis is proposed to explore whether the trading behavior of the two types of investors shifts when their favorite political party loses or wins during a Presidential Election. First, a sophisticated investor holds more shares in the firm connected with the winning political party, but has fewer shares in the losing party. However, this may not hold for non-sophisticated investors. Second, firms connected with the winning party exhibit positive stock returns, whereas firms connected with the losing party do not experience the same success. Finally, the increment shares of sophisticated investors in firms connected with the winning party are positively correlated with the stock returns around the time of the election. Specifically, sophisticated investors invest more on firms connected with the winning party, thus obtaining more abnormal returns. However, the results may not hold for non-sophisticated investors. Consequently, foreign investors are found to be sophisticated investors and political preference brings market value to this kind of investors.
    In Chapter 4, the essay examines the relationship between ownership structure and the value of political connections. We address this issue with the data of Taiwanese publicly-traded firms during the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election and the 2008 global financial crisis. First, following the literature, the value of political connections is examined through the positive abnormal stock returns of the winning-party-connected firms during the election. Then we find a negative relationship between the value of political connections and the deviation of management group’s control rights from cash flow rights. Second, using the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to control for the overall decline in investment opportunity, we find that politically connected firms with managers possessing more excess control rights underperformed in stock returns than firms without such potentially entrenched managers. Thus, studies that do not consider the inverse impacts of potential expropriation tend to present an incomplete picture of the value of political connections.
    Reference: Adhikari, Ajay, Chek Derashid, and Hao Zhang, 2006, Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25, 574-595.
    Aggarwal, Rajesh K., Felix Meschke, and Tracy Wang, 2009, Corporate political contributions: Investment or agency?, Working paper, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota.
    Agrawal, Anup, and Charles R. Knoeber, 2001, Do some outside directors play a political role?, Journal of Law and Economics 44, 179-198.
    Alesina, Alberto, 1988, Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters, American Economic Review 78, 796-805.
    Bae, Kee-Hong, René M. Stulz, and Hongping Tan, 2008, Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 581-606.
    Barber, Brad M., Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu, and Terrance Odean, 2007, Is the aggregate investor reluctant to realise losses? Evidence from Taiwan, European Financial Management 13, 423-447.
    Barber, Brad M., and Terrance Odean, 2008, All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying behavior of individual and institutional investors, Review of Financial Studies 21, 785-818.
    Barber, Brad M., Terrance Odean, and Ning Zhu, 2009, Do retail trades move markets?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 151-186.
    Barclay, Michael J., and Clifford G. Holderness, 1989, Private benefits from control of public corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371-395.
    Baum, Christopher F., Mustafa Caglayan, Dorothea Schäfer, and Oleksandr Talavera, 2008, Political patronage in Ukrainian banking, Economics of Transition 16, 537-557.
    Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Zvika Neeman, 2010, Investor protection and interest group politics, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1089-1119.
    Berkman, Henk, Rebel A. Cole, and Lawrence J. Fu, 2010, Political connections and minority-shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45, 1391-1417.
    Berle, Adolph, and Gardiner Means, 1932. The modern corporation and private property (McMillan, New York).
    Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Michael D. Whinston, 1986, Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31.
    Bliss, Mark A., and Ferdinand A. Gul, 2012, Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 1520-1527.
    Bliss, Mark A., Ferdinand A. Gul, and Abdul Majid, 2011, Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing, Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 7, 82-98.
    Boubakri, Narjess, Jean-Claude Cosset, and Walid Saffar, 2008, Political connections of newly privatized firms, Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 654-673.
    Boubakri, Narjess, Jean-Claude Cosset, and Walid Saffar, 2011, The impact of political connections on firms` operation performance and financing decisions, Working paper, American University of Sharjah.
    Boubakri, Narjess, Omrane Guedhami, Dev Mishra, and Walid Saffar, 2012, Political connections and the cost of equity capital, Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 541-559.
    Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2009, Big business owners in politics, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2133-2168.
    Campbell, John Y., Andrew W. Lo, and A. Craig Mackinlay, 1997. The econometrics of financial markets (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
    Chaney, Paul K., Mara Faccio, and David Parsley, 2011, The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics 51, 58-76.
    Charumilind, Chutatong, Raja Kali, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2006, Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis, Journal of Business 79, 181-217.
    Chen, Charles J. P., Yuan Ding, and Chansog Kim, 2010, High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world, Journal of International Business Studies 41, 1505-1524.
    Chen, Charles J. P., Zengquan Li, Xijia Su, and Zheng Sun, 2011, Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence, Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 229-243.
    Chen, Li-Wen, Shane A. Johnson, Ji-Chai Lin, and Yu-Jane Liu, 2009, Information, sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance, Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 1636-1651.
    Choe, Hyuk, Bong-Chan Kho, and René M. Stulz, 2005, Do domestic investors have an edge? The trading experience of foreign investors in Korea, Review of Financial Studies 18, 795-829.
    Choi, Jay, and Marcel Thum, 2009, The economics of politically-connected firms, International Tax and Public Finance 16, 605-620.
    Chou, Robin K., and Yun-Yi Wang, 2011, A test of the different implications of the overconfidence and disposition hypotheses, Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 2037-2046.
    Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2771.
    Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112.
    Claessens, Stijn, Erik Feijen, and Luc Laeven, 2008, Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580.
    Coate, Stephen, 2004, Pareto-improving campaign finance policy, American Economic Review 94, 628-655.
    Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010, Corporate political contributions and stock returns, Journal of Finance 65, 687-724.
    Correia, Maria M., 2009, Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality, Working paper, Stanford University.
    Cull, Robert, and Lixin Colin Xu, 2003, Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises, Journal of Development Economics 71, 533-559.
    Dinç, I. Serdar, 2005, Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 453-479.
    Dyck, Alexander, and Luigi Zingales, 2004, Private benefits of control: An international comparison, Journal of Finance 59, 537-600.
    Faccio, Mara, 2006, Politically connected firms, American Economic Review 96, 369-386.
    Faccio, Mara, 2010, Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis, Financial Management 39, 905-928.
    Faccio, Mara, Ronald W. Masulis, and John J. Mcconnell, 2006, Political connections and corporate bailouts, Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635.
    Faccio, Mara, and David C. Parsley, 2009, Sudden deaths: Taking stock of geographic ties, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 683.
    Fan, Joseph P. H., T. J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2007, Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China`s newly partially privatized firms, Journal of Financial Economics 84, 330-357.
    Ferguson, Thomas, and Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008, Betting on Hitler—the value of political connections in Nazi Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 101-137.
    Ferreira, Miguel A., and Pedro Matos, 2008, The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 499-533.
    Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the value of political connections, American Economic Review 91, 1095-1102.
    Francis, Bill B., Iftekhar Hasan, and Xian Sun, 2009, Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China, Journal of International Money and Finance 28, 696-719.
    Goldman, Eitan, Jörg Rocholl, and Jongil So, 2009, Do politically connected boards affect firm value?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360.
    Grinblatt, Mark, and Matti Keloharju, 2000, The investment behavior and performance of various investor types: A study of Finland`s unique data set, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 43-67.
    Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman, 1994, Protection for sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-850.
    Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman, 1996, Electoral competition and special interest politics, Review of Economic Studies 63, 265-286.
    Hu, Fang, and Sidney Leung, 2009, Appointment of political top executives and subsequent performance and corporate governance: Evidence from China`s listed SOEs, Working paper, Griffith University and City University of Hong Kong.
    Hung, Mingyi, T. J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2012, Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong, Journal of Accounting and Economics 53, 435-449.
    Hvidkjaer, Soeren, 2008, Small trades and the cross-section of stock returns, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1123-1151.
    Imai, Masami, and Cameron A. Shelton, 2011, Elections and political risk: New evidence from the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election, Journal of Public Economics 95, 837-849.
    Jayachandran, Seema, 2006, The Jeffords effect, Journal of Law and Economics 49, 397-425.
    Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
    Jenter, Dirk, 2005, Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions, Journal of Finance 60, 1903-1949.
    Jiambalvo, James, Shivaram Rajgopal, and Mohan Venkatachalam, 2002, Institutional ownership and the extent to which stock prices reflect future earnings, Contemporary Accounting Research 19, 117-145.
    Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186.
    Johnson, Simon, and Todd Mitton, 2003, Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia, Journal of Financial Economics 67, 351-382.
    Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian, 2005, Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.
    Knight, Brian, 2006, Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election, Journal of Public Economics 90, 751-773.
    Krueger, Anne O., 1974, The political economy of the rent-seeking society, American Economic Review 64, 291-303.
    Kuan, Tsung-Han, Chu-Shiu Li, and Shin-Herng Chu, 2011, Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms, Journal of Business Research 64, 757-764.
    Kumar, Alok, 2009, Who gambles in the stock market?, Journal of Finance 64, 1889-1933.
    La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance 54, 471-517.
    La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 2000, Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27.
    La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
    La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2002, Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance 57, 1147-1170.
    Langetieg, Terence C., 1978, An application of a three-factor performance index to measure stockholder gains from merger, Journal of Financial Economics 6, 365-383.
    Lee, Tsun-Siou, and Yin-Hua Yeh, 2004, Corporate governance and financial distress: Evidence from Taiwan, Corporate Governance: An International Review 12, 378-388.
    Lemmon, Michael L., and Karl V. Lins, 2003, Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis, Journal of Finance 58, 1445-1468.
    Leuz, Christian, Karl V. Lins, and Francis E. Warnock, 2009, Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 3245-3285.
    Leuz, Christian, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 2006, Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia, Journal of Financial Economics 81, 411-439.
    Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, Qian Wang, and Li-An Zhou, 2008, Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms, Journal of Development Economics 87, 283-299.
    Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, and Junsen Zhang, 2006, Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence from China, Economic Inquiry 44, 559-578.
    Lins, Karl V., 2003, Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159-184.
    Liu, Yunshi, David Ahlstrom, and Kuang S. Yeh, 2006, The separation of ownership and management in Taiwan`s public companies: An empirical study, International Business Review 15, 415-435.
    Mitton, Todd, 2002, A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 215-241.
    Qian, Meijun, Hongbo Pan, and Bernard Y. Yeung, 2010, Expropriation of minority shareholders in politically connected firms, Working paper, National University of Singapore.
    Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 11, 40-48.
    Ramalho, Rita, 2007, The persistence of corruption: Evidence from the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil, Working paper, The World Bank.
    Roberts, Bryan E., 1990, A dead senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits, American Journal of Political Science 34, 31-58.
    Sapienza, Paola, 2004, The effects of government ownership on bank lending, Journal of Financial Economics 72, 357-384.
    Sefcik, Stephan E., and Rex Thompson, 1986, An approach to statistical inference in cross-sectional models with security abnormal returns as dependent variable, Journal of Accounting Research 24, 316-334.
    Shefrin, Hersh, and Meir Statman, 1985, The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 40, 777-790.
    Shen, Chung-Hua, Iftekhar Hasan, Yan-Shin Chen, and Chih-Yung Lin, 2011, The benefits of political connection: Evidence from individual bank loan contracts, Working paper, National Taiwan University.
    Shen, Chung-Hua, and Chih-Yung Lin, 2012, Why government banks underperform: A political interference view, Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 181-202.
    Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1994, Politicians and firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 995-1025.
    Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.
    Shu, Pei-Gi, Yin-Hua Yeh, Shean-Bii Chiu, and Hsuan-Chi Chen, 2005, Are Taiwanese individual investors reluctant to realize their losses?, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13, 201-223.
    Sias, Richard W., and David A. Whidbee, 2010, Insider trades and demand by institutional and individual investors, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1544-1595.
    Snyder, James M., Jr., 1990, Campaign contributions as investments: The U.S. House of representatives, 1980-1986, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1195-1227.
    White, H., 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838.
    Wu, Wenfeng, Chongfeng Wu, Chunyang Zhou, and Jun Wu, 2011, Political connections, tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, forthcoming.
    Xu, Nianhang, Xinzhong Xu, and Qingbo Yuan, 2011, Political connections, financing friction, and corporate investment: Evidence from Chinese listed family firms, European Financial Management, forthcoming.
    Yeh, Yin-Hua, Tsun-Siou Lee, and Tracie Woidtke, 2001, Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan, International Review of Finance 2, 21.
    Yeh, Yin-Hua, Pei-Gi Shu, and Re-Jin Guo, 2008, Ownership structure and IPO valuation—evidence from Taiwan, Financial Management 37, 141-161.
    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    96352504
    100
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096352504
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Money and Banking] Theses

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML2364View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback