| Abstract: | 學術界對於多國公司控制機制的研究已有甚多研究（Prahalad and Doz, 1981; Gray, 1984; Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989；Muralidharan and Hamilton, 1999; Yu, Wong and Chiao, 2006）。對正式化與 非正式化控制機制的內涵已有深入探討，並提出多國公司控制機制的適用情境， 例如：當工作的性質具有目標不一致性低(low goal incongruence)，且對於績效的 衡量模糊性高時，正式的官僚性控制將會失靈，需要以派閥控制（Clan control） 的方式加以輔助(Ouchi, 1980)、在高內涵文化(high-context culture)國家，文化控 制較有效 (Lee, 2007)以及當母子公司間的互賴程度越高，多國公司的母公司越 會使用非正式控制機制（O`Donnell, 2000）。 集團企業（business groups）已被認為是除了北美地區以外，最主要的一種 企業組織型態（Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998； khanna and Palepu, 2000； Guillén, 2000； Yiu, Lu, Bruton and Hoskisson, 2007），尤其是在新興經濟體中更被認為是 最主要的企業組織（Khanna and Rivkin, 2001）。對於集團企業的控制機制（部份 研究稱為內部機制）的研究，可區分為水平連繫（horizontal connectedness）與垂 直連結（vertical linkage）兩種類型。水平連繫型的控制機制有：內部交易機制 （internal transaction mechanism）、交叉持股（cross shareholding）、互為董事 （interlocking directorates）與社會連帶（social ties）；垂直連結型的控制機制則 有：核心主導精英（core owner elite）與控制（control）兩種（Yiu, Lu, Bruton and Hoskisson, 2007）。 文獻探討顯示，我們對於集團企業如何使用正式化與非正式化控制機制的文 獻尚少，尤其是對於台灣集團企業（家族型與非家族型）在不同情境下如何選用 正式化或非正式化控制機制更是瞭解有限。因此，本研究將深入探討： （1） 台灣家族型與非家族型集團企業總部採用何種正式化與非正式化控 制機制控制旗下關係企業(或子公司)？ （2） 那些因素影響台灣家族型與非家族型集團企業總部對正式化與非正 式化控制機制的採用？ 並預期對學術上的貢獻為，有助於我們對於集團企業使用控制機制的瞭解， 可以擴展既有集團企業文獻的廣度，也可為後續的研究者提供可驗證的命題。在 實務上，則有助於我們對於台灣集團企業控制子公司行為的瞭解，可以協助台灣 集團企業在面對激烈競爭環境下，如何選擇適當的控制機制，以提高台灣集團企 業的經營績效。
The issue of control mechanisms of multinational corporations (MNCs) has been examined by many researchers（Prahalad and Doz, 1981; Gray, 1984; Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989；Muralidharan and Hamilton, 1999; Yu, Wong and Chiao, 2006. In addition, the nature of formal and informal control mechanisms has been explored extensively, and the context of MNCs adopting control mechanisms has been identified, such as: when tasks have high goal incongruence and the performance is difficult to measure, bureaucratic control is inappropriate and clan control provides better control (Ouchi, 1980)；socio-cultural control works better in high-context cultures (Lee, 2007)；higher interdependence between headquarters and subsidiaries leads to the use of informal control mechanisms（O`Donnell, 2000）. Business groups are the dominant organizational form for managing large businesses outside North America （Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998； khanna and Palepu, 2000； Guillén, 2000； Yiu, Lu, Bruton and Hoskisson, 2007）. Business groups play a prominent role especially in emerging economies（Khanna and Rivkin, 2001）. Research of business groups shows that control mechanisms (termed internal mechanisms in some studies) can be classified into two types, horizontal connectedness and vertical linkage. The control mechanisms of horizontal connectedness include internal transaction mechanism, cross-shareholdings, interlocking directorates, and social ties. The control mechanisms of vertical linkage include core owner elite and controls（Yiu, Lu, Bruton and Hoskisson, 2007）. The literature review shows that only a few studies have examined the issue regarding control mechanisms for business groups. For Taiwan business groups, including family-owned and non family-owned, we have limited knowledge about the context of using formal control and informal control mechanisms. Therefore, through a case research method, this study intends to explore the following two questions: (1) What kind of control mechanism adopted by the headquarters of Taiwan family-owned and non family-owned business groups to ensure that their ‘quanxi qiye’ (or subsidiaries) behave as they requested? (2) Which factors (or context) affecting the choice of formal and informal control mechanism by the headquarters of Taiwan business groups? The expected contribution of this study is to help us to learn more about how business groups adopt control mechanisms and to enlarge the scope of business group literature. In addition, this study may develop some propositions for future studies to test. For managerial implications, our findings can improve our understanding of how Taiwan business groups control their subsidiaries and in term helps Taiwan business group to select adequate control mechanisms in order to increase their operational performance in competitive environment. |
