政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/52810

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/52810

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政大機構典藏 > 社會科學學院 > 政治學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/52810

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題名:	我國高階政務及事務官員調動的模式：以行政院為例，1988~2010 Transfer modes of high-ranking administrative and executive officers in Taiwan government as seen in the Executive Yuan from 1988 to 2010
作者:	陳鴻章 Chen, Hung Chang
貢獻者:	寇健文蔡佳泓陳鴻章 Chen, Hung Chang
關鍵詞:	國民黨民進黨行政院制度性代理人理論政治交易成本 KMT DPP Executive Yuan Institutional-Agency Theory Political - Transaction Cost
日期:	2010
上傳時間:	2012-04-17 09:25:06 (UTC+8)
摘要:	為了探討與分析長期以來存在，關於行政院高階政務官、事務官員調動的「普遍說」與「特殊說」爭議，並且探究哪些制度性、組織性因素，對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響。本研究嘗試在制度的代理人理論架構，以及相關理論預設之下，以一九八八年第一季到兩千零一十年第四季，時序橫跨李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統主政期間，包括行政院本部暨所屬三十二個部會的高階政務、事務官員，作為研究對象，進行實證的分析。在本文的第一到第四章，我們分別說明了研究動機與背景、進行相關文獻回顧、探討研究理論，以及說明研究問題與模型。而在第五章則是分析、探討，台灣於一九九零年代初期，到一九九零年代中期，因為持續進行憲法增修條文的制訂，進而使得總統在憲法本文，以及憲法增修條文，所構成的憲政制度上，獲得了行政院高階行政官員的人事任免權。而且總統在取得了這個制度上的重要權力之後，行政院高階行政官員的任命、調動，就成為總統掌控行政體系的重要制度性工具，同時更是高階行政官員控制的重要手段。此外，我們更進一步在第六章，分析了台灣從一九八零年代晚期，到兩千零一十年間，分別在不同階段，先後掌權的李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統，對行政院高階行政官員，所採取以高階行政官員任命、調動，作為手段的控制模式，並且探討於第四章所提出的假設一、假設二、假設三，分別獲得實證資料支持的情況。至於第七章則是先透過總體資料的分析，探究假設四到假設十一，能否獲得實證資料的支持，同時更以部會為單位的季度別資料，建構縱橫資料的多元迴歸模型，用以分析哪些因素，對於行政院高階行政官員的更替，是有所影響的。然而，在相關的實證分析之後，我們可以確切的認為，以往關於行政院高階行政官員控制上，所存在的「普遍說」與「特殊說」的爭論，是以普遍說可以獲得理論上，以及實證資料的支持。而就各種可能對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響的制度性、組織性因素而言，總統處在什麼樣的政治時機、面對哪些性質的部會，將會是關鍵。當總統必須更為重視行政體系的穩定，以及施政品質時，必然會選擇壓抑行政官員控制的強度。反之，當總統所面對的是，委託代理人難題疑慮的攀升，且有較大的空間容忍行政體系的不穩定時，那麼可以預期的是，大範圍、數量龐大的高階行政官員清洗，將會接踵而至。最後，透過相關資料的分析，我們也發現了，在一次、二次政黨輪替，於西元兩千年到兩千零八年，相繼的發生，以及相應出現範圍廣泛、人數繁多，全面性高階行政官員清洗，也使台灣社會，在短期間之內，必須付出可觀的政治交易成本。這樣的情況，也使得台灣民眾的民主信念，是有所動搖，同時這也對於台灣的民主政治發展，是一個不容被忽視的隱憂。 This reasearch offers an analysis of the long-standing discourse on transferal patterns of government officials in Taiwan, with the focus on the much-debated “general theory” vs. “special theory” approach. We will look at the systemic and organizational factors that influence the appointment, replacement, and transferal of both administrative and executive officers in the higher echelons of government. Specifically, this paper examines the time period from 1988 to 2010, employing a systematic agent framework in combination with related theoretical parameters to explore the concrete situation in the Executive Yuan and its 32 ministries, commissions, and other agencies under three consecutive administrations (i.e. presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou). In the first four chapters, we will outline background and motive of this paper, give an overview of past research on this topic, scrutinize relevant theoretical approaches, and illustrate research problems and models. In the fifth chapter, we explore and analyze the period from the early to the mid-1990s, a time that saw repeated amendments and additions to the constitution that gave the president increasingly greater powers of appointment and removal of cabinet members. These powers have become one of the most important political tools the president wields, allowing the nation’s leader to exert highly effective and immediate control over the Executive Yuan, in particular over its highest-ranking officials. In the sixth chapter, we will cover the entire period from the late 1980s to the 2010. During this time, three presidents were successively at the helm (Lee from 1988-2000, Chen from 2000-2008, Ma since 2008), and we will scrutinize the different appointment and transferal modes applied during their terms, in particular as regards their use as a tool of political control. In addition, we will further discuss the first three hypotheses initially proposed in chapter four, and show if and how they are borne out by the data and facts assembled in this research. Chapter seven contains a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data to facilitate our discussion of hypotheses four to eleven as first proposed in chapter four, and to determine whether or not these are supported by the empirical data. At the same time, we look at the quarterly figures from Executive Yuan ministries and commissions to create a multiple regression model of the cross-section data, which will help us to analyze which specific factors influence the substitution and transferal of high-ranking officials. After a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we will find that of the two theories usually applied to the problem of systemic and political control over the higher echelons of the executive, i.e. the general and the special theory mentioned above, the general theory is in fact better supported by the relevant set of data. As for which particular systemic and organizational factors may influence the replacement or substitution of high-ranking administrative and executive cabinet members, the crucial parameters affecting this question are the larger political climate that the president faces, as well as the type and political weight of the concerned ministries and commissions. At times when administrative stability and quality are the paramount considerations, the president will necessarily deemphasize his control over the executive and refrain from making too many personnel changes, while in times of political crisis, or when there is growing concern over the competence and suitability of his entrusted agents (i.e. leading members of the Executive Yuan’s subdivisions) and thus more tolerance for change, one will almost always see large-scale cabinet reshuffles as the president attempts to flush out unfit or unwanted elements. Finally, an analysis of the overall data also shows that the two transitions of power Taiwan has seen in 2000 and 2008 respectively were—as a matter of course—accompanied by extensive personnel changes as numerous high-ranking government officials were removed from office to make place for new faces. These far-reaching waves of “political purging” and complete reorganization of the cabinet within short periods of time have come at a considerable political cost for Taiwan’s society as a whole. This has somewhat shaken the population’s faith in democracy as a political system, and here lies a significant potential concern for the future development of Taiwan’s democracy.
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