政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/52138
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52138


    Title: 懲罰效果的兩個實驗研究
    Other Titles: Two Experimental Studies on Punishment Effects
    Authors: 徐麗振
    Contributors: 行政院國家科學委員會
    國立政治大學財政系
    Keywords: 實驗;懲罰;獎賞;逃漏稅;公共財;最弱連結;最佳出擊
    Date: 2014-10
    Issue Date: 2011-11-16 15:11:31 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 由於公共財不具排他性與不具敵對性，若由私人捐獻來提供公共財，免費享用的問題將存在。為改進公共財提供的無效率問題，建立懲罰或獎賞機制為一可行的方式，在懲罰文獻中對懲罰與獎賞機制的建立與成效亦有廣泛的討論。本研究計畫為兩年期計畫，每一年的計畫包括一個與懲罰機制有關的實驗研究。第一年的實驗研究將探討在weak-link 與best-shot 兩公共財賽局中，懲罰與獎賞對公共財捐獻的效果。懲罰文獻在自願捐獻公共財方面的討論，多採用線性的公共財模型，鮮少討論weak-link 與best-shot 等在現實生活中也常出現的公共財捐獻型態。因此本計畫擬將懲罰與獎賞運用於這兩個公共財賽局中，觀察其對公共財捐獻的效果，此外並將深入分析懲罰與獎賞機制是否會有文獻中所提及的，有懲罰或獎賞之下的每人平均報酬反而比無懲罰或獎賞下來得低的無效率問題，以及antisocial punishment 是否會發生。第二年的實驗研究擬將懲罰文獻中的懲罰機制運用在逃漏稅的實驗中。除了解決公共財免用享用的問題外，懲罰機制也被應用在其他許多議題上，但是在逃漏稅方面的討論卻幾乎付之闕如。另一方面，逃漏稅的實驗研究多忽略納稅人（尤其是誠實的納稅人）本身也有稽核逃漏稅的動機，並且假設政府稽核與懲罰逃漏稅不需任何成本。懲罰文獻中懲罰機制的設計與發現正好可以彌補逃漏稅實驗文獻在這些方面的不足。因此第二年計畫將在逃漏稅的實驗中加入一類似懲罰文獻中的懲罰機制，觀察在此機制下的逃漏稅水準和傳統的外生懲罰機制下的逃漏稅水準有何不同，此外上述懲罰機制的無效率問題亦將一併討論。
    Due to the properties of non-exclusion and non-rivalry, the problem of free-riding will be present if public goods are provided via voluntary contributions. To resolve the inefficiency problem in public good provision, establishing a punishment or reward mechanism may be a feasible method. Indeed, punishment and reward mechanisms have been broadly discussed in the punishment literature. This research proposal contains two punishment-related projects, and each project will be implemented in one year. The first-year project plans to explore the effects of punishment and reward on voluntary contributions in the weakest-link and best-shot games. Weakest-link and best-shot games are two often-discussed public good games, and there are many related examples in our daily life. However, studies on punishments often confine the discussion to the linear public-good game. Therefore, this project will study the punishment and reward mechanisms in weakest-link and best-shot formats. Furthermore, the two inefficiency problems that appear in the punishment literature (one is antisocial-punishment phenomenon and the other is that the average payoff with punishment may be lower than the average payoff without punishment) will also be investigated. The second-year project plans to apply the punishment mechanism to tax evasion experiments. Besides resolving the inefficiency problem of public good provision, the punishment mechanism that discussed in the punishment literature has also been applied to many other issues. However, it is barely found in tax evasion studies. On the other hand, experimental studies on tax evasion often ignore that taxpayers (especially honest taxpayers) have the incentive to detect and punish evasion, and that auditing and punishing evasion is costly. Therefore, the second-year project plans to combine punishment and tax evasion literatures. The punishment mechanism used in this research is similar to that in the punishment literature, but some variations are made to make it more practical and easier to be implemented in the tax environment. The purpose of this project is to investigate whether the punishment mechanism is more efficient in improving compliance as compared with an often-discussed random-audit scheme. The above inefficiency problems related to the punishment mechanism will also be analyzed
    Relation: 基礎研究
    學術補助
    研究期間:10008~ 10107
    研究經費:691仟元
    Source URI: http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB/result.jsp?id=1927491&plan_no=NSC100-2410-H004-065-MY2&plan_year=100&projkey=PF10006-0841&target=plan&highStr=*&check=0&pnchDesc=%E6%87%B2%E7%BD%B0%E6%95%88%E6%9E%9C%E7%9A%84%E5%85%A9%E5%80%8B%E5%AF%A6%E9%A9%97%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] NSC Projects

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