政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/51629
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113318/144297 (79%)
造访人次 : 50952681      在线人数 : 934
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/51629


    题名: 慈善組織區位決策與網路效果
    Charity Niche Marketing and Network Effect
    作者: 劉建宏
    贡献者: 陳國樑
    劉建宏
    关键词: 慈善捐款
    網路外部性
    Hotelling模型
    日期: 2009
    上传时间: 2011-10-11 17:03:01 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在進行捐贈行為時，若以極大化個人效用為出發點，捐贈者首要應以慈善組織的理念與關懷對象與自身關懷對象是否相近為主要考量，本文將此關懷對象的定位定義為慈善組織的區位，討論慈善組織在競爭上的區位策略。除此之外，同時也將慈善組織的規模與公信力對捐贈者的影響力納入考量。
    本文以線性城市（linear city）模型補捉捐贈者與慈善組織的關懷對象的區位，並考慮到捐贈者對於慈善組織規模的考量，將傳統應用在電信產品的「網路效果」引入捐贈者的效用函數中，同時考慮區位差距與組織規模對捐贈者的影響。本文研究後有幾點發現：第一，慈善組織為了避免過度的募款競爭，會避免服務對象的性質過度重疊；第二：網路效果的引入會加劇慈善組織之間的競爭進而提升慈善組織的募款努力程度；第三：當慈善組織之間的網路效果規模有差距時，捐贈資源會集中到規模較大的慈善組織，同時規模較大的慈善組織會擴大其服務對象的範圍，而規模較小的慈善組織所得的捐贈資源也會因此減少。
    Naturally, utility maximizing donors first consider charities sharing their same ideology towards those in need of helps. Therefore, in setting up fund-raising charities,
    the choice of “location”, in the spectrum of all potential donees, will have effects on the fund-raising results. In addition, donors also often take into account operation scales and credibility when it comes to choosing among different charities.
    This study proposes a model that the location choice of two homogenous charities is captured through a linear city framework, and a “network effect” in the utility of donors is introduced to account for the influence of scale and credibility of charities. Several findings emerge. First, in equilibrium, charities differentiate in the
    choice of location to avoid intense competition in fund-raising efforts. Second, the existence of network effect drives competing charities to exert more fund-raising
    efforts. Third, asymmetric network externality has the effect to redistribute donations away from the small network charity when the large network charity moves towards
    to “center” of the market. Finally, some welfare implications are explored.
    參考文獻: Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A. (1997), Rival Charities. Journal of Public
    Economics, 66(3), 449 467.
    Chen, C.-S. and Lai, F.-C. (2008), Location choice and optimal zoning under
    Cournot competition. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 38(2),
    119 126
    Chu, C.-Y. (1986), Product Differentiation and Preference Structure: A Note on
    Hotelling"s Spatial Competition model. Academia Economic Papers, 14(2),
    199 210.
    Cremer, H. and Thisse, J.-F. (1994), Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated
    Oligopoly. International Economic Review, 35(3), 613 633.
    D`Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J. F. (1979), On Hotelling`s
    "Stability in Competition". Econometrica, 47(5), 1145 1150.
    Dewatripont, M. (1987), The Role of Indifference in Sequential Models of Spatial
    Competition: An Example. Economics Letters, 23(4), 323 328.
    Duncan, B. (2004), A Theory of Impact Philanthropy. Journal of Public
    Economics, 88(9 10), 2159 2180.
    Economides, N. (1986), Minimal and Maximal Product Differentiation in
    Hotelling"s Duoply. Economics Letters, 21(1), 67 71.
    Economides, N. (1996), The Economics of Networks. International Journal of
    Industrial Organization, 14(6), 673 699.
    Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985), Standardization, Compatability, and
    Innovation. Rand Journal of Economics, 16(1), 70 83.
    Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1986), Installed base and compatibility: Innovation,
    product preannouncements, and predation. American Economic Review,
    76(5), 940 955.
    Fisher, F. M. (1977), On Donor Sovereignty and United Charities. American
    Economic Review, 67(4), 632 638.
    Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J.-F. (1979), Price Competition, Quality and
    Income Disparities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2(3), 340 359.
    Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J.-F. (1980), Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated
    Industry. Journal of Economic Theory, 22(2), 327 338.
    Gabszewicz, J. J. and Wauthy, X. (2004), Two-Sided Markets and Price
    Competition With Multi-Homing. Social Science Research Network,
    CORE discussion paper no. 2004/30
    Ghosh, S., Karaivanov, A. and Oak, M. (2007), A Case for Bundling Public
    Goods Contributions. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9(3), 425 449.
    Gupt, Y. and Veendorp, E. C. H. (1997), Externalities in a Hotelling Model.
    Southern Economic Journal, 64(1), 321 325.
    Hotelling, H. (1929), Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal, 39(1),
    41 57.
    Katz, M. L. and Shapiro, C. (1985), Network Externalities, Competition, and
    Compatibility. American Economic Review, 75(3), 424 440.
    Lai, F.-C. and Tsai, J.-F. (2004), Duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small
    open city. Journal of Urban Economics, 55(3), 614 626.
    Lerner, A. P. and Singer, H. W. (1937), Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial
    Competition. The Journal of Political Economy, 45(2), 145 186.
    Neven, D. (1986), On Hotelling’ s Competition with Non-Uniform Customer
    Distributions. Economics Letters, 21(2), 121 126.
    Rohlfs, J. (1974), A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications
    Service. Bell Journal of Economics, 5(1), 16 37.
    Rose-Ackerman, S. (1982), Charitable Giving and `Excessive` Fundraising.
    Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97(2), 193 212.
    Smithies, A. (1941), Optimum Location in spatial competition. Journal of
    political Economy, 41(3), 423 439.
    Tabuchi, T. and Thisse, J.-F. (1995), Asymmetric Equilibria in Spatial
    Competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(2),
    213 227.
    王振軒 (2005)，「非政府組織議題與發展」，鼎茂圖書。
    陳婉妤 (2005)，「你也可以快樂助人，行善學正流行」，時報周刊，1484 期，
    頁12 22。
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    97255024
    98
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255024
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    502401.pdf914KbAdobe PDF21510检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈