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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/50853


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    题名: 二篇與公司財務相關之論文：資本結構與經理人薪酬
    Two essays on corporate finance: capital structure and executive compensation
    作者: 林家帆
    贡献者: 陳威光
    康榮寶
    林家帆
    关键词: 經理人薪酬
    激勵性薪酬
    總體經濟條件
    最適資本結構
    產品市場競爭
    Executive compensation
    Incentive pay
    Macroeconomic conditions
    Optimal capital structure
    Product market competition
    日期: 2010
    上传时间: 2011-09-29 16:50:40 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文包含二篇與公司財務相關之文章，第一篇文章嘗試在考量總體經濟條件和公司生產力衝擊下，建構一個簡單結構式模型以探討公司之資本結構決策。特別的是，由該模型可得到公司最適負債比率與總體經濟條件衝擊之報酬波動性呈反向關係，惟公司最適負債比率與公司生產力衝擊之報酬波動性呈正向關係。第二篇文章係利用對稱寡占產業均衡模型，以探討產業內經理人薪酬決策之異質性。即使產業內所有公司皆為同質，在模型均衡下存在有些公司會採取激勵性薪酬，而其他公司則不採取激勵性薪酬。該模型預期當市場競爭性增加時，產業內公司經理人薪酬決策會更具異質性。此外，上述二篇文章皆分別以美國製造業資料進行實證，並且實證結果均符合其模型之預期。
    This dissertation proposes two essays about corporate finance. Essay one develops a simple structural model to investigate a firm’s capital structure choices in consideration of macroeconomic conditions and firm-level productivity shocks. The model particularly generates the implication that the optimal debt ratio is negatively correlated to the return volatility of macroeconomic conditions, but positively correlated to that of firm-level productivity. Essay two is contributed to explore the heterogeneity of the compensation decision within the industry by employing a symmetric oligopoly industry equilibrium model. Within the equilibrium some firms will adopt incentive pay while others will not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the compensation decision as the intensity of market competition increases. Both of the two essays further provide empirical evidence of the US manufacturing industry to support the model implications.
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    91352501
    99
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913525011
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[金融學系] 學位論文

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