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| Title: | 選擇公開募集或私募管道融資影響因素之探討
A study on the choice between public offering and private placement |
| Authors: | 黃藍萱 |
| Contributors: | 林宛瑩
黃藍萱 |
| Keywords: | 私募
公開發行
現金增資
private placement
public offering
seasoned equity offering |
| Date: | 2010 |
| Issue Date: | 2011-09-29 16:39:14 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究以羅吉斯迴歸模型探討影響上市櫃公司選擇籌資之因素，籌資工具包括股權與債務，並進一步探討若籌資工具為普通股，影響私募普通股或現金增資之因素。
實證結果發現，公司選擇以私募或公開發行管道籌措資金的決策，主要和下列因素有關：(1) 資訊不對稱程度愈高之公司，愈傾向以私募籌資；(2) 風險愈高之公司，愈傾向以私募籌資；(3) 信用品質愈差之公司，愈傾向以私募籌資；(4) 成長性愈強之公司，愈不傾向以私募籌資；(5) 股票市場情況愈好，公司愈不傾向以私募籌資。
公司選擇以私募普通股或現金增資籌措資金的決策，主要和下列因素有關：(1) 資訊不對稱程度愈高之公司，愈傾向以私募普通股籌資；(2) 風險愈高之公司，愈傾向以私募普通股籌資；(3) 股票市場情況愈好，公司愈不傾向以私募籌資。
This research uses Logistic Model to investigate some specific factors which may influence firms’ choices between issuing securities in private market (private placement) and in public market (public offering). As for the funding mechanism, both equity securities and debt securities are included. Then the range of funding mechanism is narrowed to common stock and this research analyzes the possible factors which influence firms’ choices between issuing private equity and seasoned equity offering follows.
The empirical results on the choices between issuing in private market or public market indicate the following: (1) Firms with higher information asymmetry tend to raise fund by private placement rather than by public offering. (2) Firms with higher operating risk tend to raise fund by private placement rather than by public offering. (3) Firms with worse credit quality tend to raise fund by private placement rather than by public offering. (4) Firms with stronger growth potential tend to raise fund by public offering rather than by private placement. (5) When the performance of the stock market is better, firms tend to raise fund by public offering rather than by private placement.
The empirical results on the choices between issuing private equity or seasoned equity offerings indicate the following: (1) Firms with higher information asymmetry tend to raise fund by private equity rather than by seasoned equity offering. (2) Firms with higher operating risk tend to raise fund by private equity rather than by seasoned equity offering. (3) When the performance of the stock market is better, firms tend to raise fund by seasoned equity offering rather than by private equity. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
98353007
99 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0983530071 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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