English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113648/144635 (79%)
Visitors : 51580749      Online Users : 992
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/5009


    Title: 利益團體 - 資訊傳遞機制之分析
    Other Titles: Interest Groups---An Analysis of the Information Transfer Mechanism
    Authors: 周德宇
    Keywords: 利益團體;資訊傳遞;訊號賽局;分離均衡
    Interest group;Information transfer;Signaling game;Separating equilibrium
    Date: 1999
    Issue Date: 2007-04-18 18:25:47 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 臺北市:國立政治大學財政研究所
    Abstract: 本計畫之研究目的在於觀察利益團體如何透過一訊號賽局之互動方式,對公共部門進行遊說;並分析對均衡可能產生影響的要件。舉例而言,勞資團體在基本工資制定的協商過程中,存在著資訊不對稱的情況,並且有協商和遊說並存的過程。本計畫採用訊號賽局理論的分析方法,最後可確認一個分離的均衡(Separating equilibrium),說明勞方可以根據資方所傳送的訊號去正確的猜測到資方所擁有的私人資訊。主要結論為:在求取社會福利極大的目標下,公共部門應該在社會福利函數中給予資訊弱勢團體較高的權數,或是在賽局環境中限制政府取得全部資訊,預期將可以減少利益團體投入遊說的成本而減少社會資源的浪費。
    This research project aims to develop a signaling game-theoretic model with the features of two interest groups lobbying under asymmetric information structure while the government playing as both a information transfer mechanism and a final policy maker. One of the real-word examples fitting the framework is the determination of minimum wages. Among the findings, two important policy-relevant conclusions can be reached: Firstly, the higher is the weight put on the less-informed interest group, the better are the chances to settle without incurring litigation or lobbying (deadweight) costs; Secondly, the public sector being less-informed about the settlement offer is a welfare improving status than the completely informed case.
    Description: 核定金額:286200元
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    882415H004016.pdf38KbAdobe PDF21475View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback