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    题名: 員工認股權、公司治理特性與盈餘管理關聯性之研究
    作者: 連偵均
    贡献者: 林宛瑩
    連偵均
    关键词: 員工認股權
    激勵性獎酬
    盈餘管理
    employee stock options
    pay-for-performance
    earnings management
    日期: 2008
    上传时间: 2010-12-08 14:03:12 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以2002年至2007年曾發行員工認股權之國內上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本，首先從公司特性及股權結構之觀點，分析公司選擇發行員工認股權之決定性因素。此外，本研究進一步以績效調整後之盈餘管理幅度為應變數，從員工認股權佔總獎酬之重要程度，探討員工認股權、公司治理特性與盈餘管理之關聯性。
    實證結果顯示，在公司發行員工認股權之決定性因素方面，公司成長機會、人力資源貢獻度、員工股票分紅比率與公司發行員工認股權之可能性呈顯著正向關係，而自由現金流量、股權結構綜合指標則與公司發行員工認股權之可能性呈顯著負向關係。在探討員工認股權、公司治理特性與盈餘管之關聯性方面，員工認股權佔總獎酬之比例與盈餘管理幅度呈顯著正向關係，而公司治理特性綜合指標則與盈餘管理幅度呈顯著負向關係。
    Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies has been issued employee stock option listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 2002-2007. First, this thesis analyses the determinant of the company issued employee stock options of the company characteristics and ownership structure. Second, uses the performance matched discretionary accruals and the employee stock option of the total compensation to explore the impacts of employee stock options and corporate governance characteristics on the earnings management.
    The empirical results show that in the determinant of the company issued employee stock options, the company`s growth opportunities, the contribution of human resources, employee stock bonus to total bonus and the possibility of issued employee stock options was a significant positive relationship, and free cash flow, ownership structure composite indicator the possibility of issued employee stock options was a significant negative to the relationship. In the impacts of employee stock options and corporate governance characteristics on the earnings management, the employee stock option of total compensation and earnings management was a significant positive relationship. The corporate governance and earnings management was a significant negative relationship.
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