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    题名: 董事會監督強度決定性因素之實證研究
    An empirical study on determinant factors of the intensiveness of board monitoring
    作者: 邱筱茜
    贡献者: 汪泱若
    邱筱茜
    关键词: 董事會監督功能
    總經理權力
    家族管理
    董事會特性
    Board monitoring
    CEO power
    Family management
    Board characteristics
    日期: 2008
    上传时间: 2010-12-08 13:57:45 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 過去研究指出，增加董事會的開會次數將提高董事會的監督效能。本研究以董事會之開會次數為應變數，納入總經理特性、董事會特性與財務特性，探討影響董事會監督強度之決定性因素。本研究發現，總經理任期、總經理持股比例、董事會規模及前期經營績效對董事會監督強度存在顯著負向關係，而總經理與董事長為同一人對董事會的監督強度呈顯著正相關。進一步將樣本依總經理是否屬於控制家族成員，將樣本分成兩組樣本後，本研究發現，總經理之控制家族色彩會削弱總經理任期與董事會監督強度關聯性，但也具有增強總經理與董事長為同一人、董事會規模與董事會監督強度關聯性的效果。
    Prior researches argue that board meeting time is an important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board (e.g., Vafeas, 1999; Ryan et al., 2007). We use a Poisson model with the number of board meetings as the dependent variable and examine the determinant factors of the intensiveness of board monitoring. We find that the intensiveness of board monitoring is driven by CEO characteristics, board characteristics, and prior performance. CEO tenure, CEO ownership, board size and prior performance are significantly inversely related to the intensiveness of board monitoring. CEO/chair duality positively influences the number of meetings (significant at the 0.1 level). We analyze separately the relations between CEO characteristics, board characteristics, prior performance and meeting frequency for non-family CEOs and CEOs who are numbers of the controlling family, and use interaction term between independent proxies and the controlling family dummy variable to test for the significance of these differences. We find that the relation between the number of board meetings and CEO tenure is weaker when the CEO is a member of the founding family. We also find that the relations between the intensity of board monitoring and CEO duality, board size are stronger when the CEO is a member of the founding family.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    96353005
    97
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    数据类型: thesis
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