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    題名: 銀行海外擴張的因素探討與貪污對其影響
    The Analysis of Overseas Expansions for MNBs: Determinants and Corruption`s Impact
    作者: 蔡淵禮
    貢獻者: 朱浩民
    沈中華
    蔡淵禮
    關鍵詞: 海外擴張
    跨國銀行
    貪污
    海外營業據點
    Overseas Expansion
    Multinational Bank
    Corruption
    Foreign Office
    日期: 2009
    上傳時間: 2010-12-08 01:57:02 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文研究主題有二，第一，我們以全球1,000大銀行至40國家金融中心城市所設立的據點資料，探討全球大型銀行的海外擴張動機因素。第二，我們使用45個國家銀行在46個國家金融中心城市所設立的分行資料，探討貪污對銀行海外擴張的影響。第一個研究主題可得知全球大型銀行海外投資的一般性策略思維與吸引全球大型銀行投資的一般性誘因，不同於過去文獻以特定單一國家或先進國家銀行為研究對象，只能探究得知特定策略思維與特定吸引誘因；第二個研究主題可得知貪污在銀行跨國投資裡所扮演的角色，而此角色在過去銀行跨國投資文獻裡並未被探究。
    　　第一個研究主題，我們以折衷理論（eclectic theory）為基礎探究銀行海外擴張動機因素，依該理論得三項主要實證研究結果：所有權優勢方面，規模越大或經營績效越佳的銀行在海外擴張態度上較為積極；內部化優勢方面，銀行會選擇與來源國貿易往來密切的國家設立據點；區位優勢方面，業務機會、市場成長空間及熟悉度皆是吸引銀行設立海外據點的重要誘因。與我們預期相反的是，銀行喜歡進入業務高度限制的國家設立據點，其可能原因是這些國家的銀行市場有較高利潤與較大成長空間之故。
    第二個研究主題，由實證研究得知，貪污會對跨國投資產生負向影響，亦即貪污會阻礙跨國銀行分行投資活動的進行。再者，我們進一步檢視兩國貪污環境差異的影響是否為負向與其負向影響是否會隨來源國貪污程度的增加而減少，亦即負向影響是否存在不對稱性，兩者皆得到證實。此結果顯示貪污差異性會增加跨國投資的進入成本，銀行因而較傾向在貪污環境相似的國家設立分行。不對稱的負向影響則意味著來自越貪污國家的銀行對於貪污環境差異性有相對較佳的適應能力，因此，我們建議銀行應培養高貪污環境政治風險因應能力以利跨國投資的進行。
    This paper has two topics. First, we investigate the determinants of the overseas physical expansions of world’s large banks, using individual bank data on the number of foreign offices set up by top 1,000 world banks in host financial center cities located in 40 countries. Second, we explore the impact of corruption on banks’ overseas physical expansions, using data on the number of foreign branches set up by banks of 45 countries in host financial center cities located in 46 countries. Through the first one, we can know the strategy thinking of world’s large banks and common incentives that attract their investments, differing from previous studies. Through the second topic, we can know the playing role of corruption in banks’ overseas investment, which no previous study had explored before.
    In the first studing, we investigate the determinants of the overseas expansions of world’s large banks in views of eclectic theory and our results lead to three result. First, about the factors of ownership advantage, larger size or better performance banks tend to be aggressive in internationalization. Second, about the factor of internalization advantage, banks tend to establish more overseas offices in the countries that have closer relationship of international trade with home country. Finally, about the factors of location advantage, banks are more likely to operate in countries that have more banking opportunities, higher accessibility of market or lower information costs. But, not consistent with our expectations, banks also prefer to invest in more regulated markets, possibly because they expect to obtain higher profits or market shares in these countries.
    In the second studing, we examine the impact of corruption on overseas investment and find the negative impact. Corruption impedes multinational banks’ cross-border investment and thus decreases foreign branch establishing. We also find the negative impact of corruption difference between two countries and its asymmetric effect. The first one indicates that corruption difference would increase the entry cost to foreign banks and result in negative investment decisions. The second one means that negative impact of corruption difference diminishes with the level of source-country corruption. It shows that bank from higher corruption country has better capacity to handle this difference. We suggest that multinational banks should improve the managing bribery skills to benefit their overseas investment.
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    93352506
    98
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0933525061
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[金融學系] 學位論文

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