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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37431


    Title: 外人直接投資或關稅遊說-污染外部性模型
    Authors: 劉郁潔
    Contributors: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    劉郁潔
    Keywords: 外人直接投資
    政治獻金
    技術外溢效果
    污染外部性
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2009-09-19 13:47:45 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 政府在制定政策的過程中，往往會受到利益團體影響。我們藉由 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所發展的政治獻金模型為架構，討論在國內生產具有負面外部性的情況下，政府決定是否開放具有生產優勢的外國廠商進入本國生產的決策。我們發現開放外人直接投資與否，受到政府對社會福利重視的程度所影響。在政府極端不重視社會福利且生產完全無生產技術外溢時，政府將不會選擇開放國外廠商進入本國投資，而一般情況下，當市場規模夠大且政府重視社會福利有一定程度時，生產時所造成的負面外部性愈大，本國政府將傾向不開放外國廠商進入本國直接生產。
    Since the domestic government can makes its choice between alternative policy instruments to maximize its’ welfare, this paper analyzes how a domestic government makes the policy about foreign direct investment by Grossman and Helpman (1994) political contribution model. It shows that opening FDI or not is affected by the weight that the domestic government puts on the social welfare. We found that domestic government tends not to open FDI when it puts little weight on the social welfare. In this case that the weight and market are large enough, the domestic government tends to open FDI as the pollution externality increases.
    Reference: 1. 王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005)，「政治獻金限額與關稅遊說」，《經濟研究》，41(2)：207-247。
    2. 王智賢、翁永和 (2006)，「最適自製率與政治獻金」，《人文及社會科學集刊》，18(2)：269-291。
    3. 王智賢、林惠敏 (2007) 「污染管制與政治獻金」，《經社法制論叢》，40, 123-149。
    4. 王智賢、楊敦雅 (2007) 「仿冒查緝與政治獻金」，《經濟研究》，44, 107-138。
    5. 林奇蓉 (2004)，「政治遊說與策略性貿易政策」，《經濟論文叢刊》，22, 203-228。
    6. 邱俊榮、蔡宜臻 (2006)，「對外直接投資與研究發展」，《經濟論文》，35:1, 53-82。
    7. 賴育邦 (2005a)，「利益團體、工資談判與環境政策」。《農業與經濟》，35, 87-118。
    8. 賴育邦 (2005b)，「全球經濟整合對地方環境政策之衝擊-一個「共同代理人」模型的應用」，《經社法制論叢》，35：259-284。
    9. 賴育邦 (2006)，「污染許可交易與利益團體」，《經濟論文叢刊》，34:3, 264-284。
    10. Aidt, T. S. (1997) “ Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy, ” Journal of Public Economics, 69, 1-16.
    11. Aidt, T. S. (1998) “ Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy, ” Public Choice, 93:3-4, 455-457.
    12. Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1986), “Menu Auction, Resource Allocation,and Economic Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.
    13. Blomstrom, M. and H. Persson (1983), “ Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in An Underdeveloped Economy: Evidence from the Mexico Manufacturing Industry, ” World Development, 11, 493-501
    14. Chuang, Y, C. and C. M. Lin (1999), “Foreign Direct Investment, R&D, and Spillover Efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan``s Manufacturing Firms, ” Journal of Development Studies, 35, 117-137.
    15. Fischer, R. and P. Serra (2000) “Standards and Protection,” Journal of International Economics, 52:3, 77-400.
    16. Gawande, K., P. Krishna and M. J. Robbins (2004), “ Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 10205.
    17. Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale, ” American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.
    18. Helpman, E. , M. J. Melitz and S. R. Yeaple (2004), “Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms, ” American Economic Review, 94, 300-316.
    19. Konishi, H. , K. Saggi, and S. Weber (1999), “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direct Investment, ” Journal of International Economics, 49, 289-308.
    20. Lai, Y.-B (2003) “Interest Group, Economic Competition and Endogenous Public Policy, ” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 159, 342-361.
    21. Lai, Y.-B (2006a) “Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives,? ” Taipei Economic Inquiry, 42, 1-24
    22. Lai, Y.-B (2006b) “Interest Group, Trade Liberlization, and Environmental Standards, ” Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics, 34, 269-390.
    23. Lai, Y.-B (2007) “The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Right in the Presence of Political Distortions, ” Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics, 36, 367-388.
    24. Mitra, D. (2002),“Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements, ” Journal of International Economics, 57, 473-485.
    25. Magee, C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation：An Application to the Free-Rider Problem, ” Journal of International Economics, 57, 449-471.
    26. Wang, J-Y. and M. Blomstrom (1992),“Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer：A Simple Model, ” European Economics Review, 36, 137-155.
    27. Wang, J. S., H. W. Koo, and T. J. Chen (2006), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby, ” Japan and the World Economy, 18: 4, 488-511.
    28. Young, A. (1992), “A Tale of Two Cities：Factor Accumulation and Technical Change in Hong Kong and Singapore ,” in O. J. Blanchard and S. Fischer(eds), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, pp. 13-54, Cambridge MA：MIT Press
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    96255028
    97
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255028
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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