政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/37428

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/37428

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政大機構典藏 > 社會科學學院 > 財政學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/37428

请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/37428

题名:	學術期刊禁止一稿多投之經濟分析 An economic analysis of the prohibition against multiple submission
作者:	林士揚 Lin, Shih-Yang
贡献者:	周德宇林忠正林士揚 Lin, Shih-Yang
关键词:	學術期刊一稿多投審稿延遲 academic journal multiple submission refereeing delay
日期:	2008
上传时间:	2009-09-19 13:47:20 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本研究主旨在於探討學術期刊普遍禁止一稿多投的現象與其成因。文章中將使用考慮出版者以及學術投稿者的兩階段模型來刻劃投稿、審查，以及投稿規則決策的過程。初步模型將呈現當投稿者無明顯時間偏好以及各期刊審稿延遲時間一致時，一稿一投或是一稿多投規則對於整體學術產業而言並無差異。其後本文第四章將導入差異審稿延遲所帶來的影響並得出擁有較高聲望的期刊為避免在一稿多投制度下次級期刊利用較快的審查速度奪取較高品質的文章因而將不願意開放一稿多投的結論。本研究後部分章節將分析各投稿規則對於整體產業福利水準之影響並得到以下結論。一稿一投制度不見得會為整體產業帶來福利增進，但由於投稿者與出版者之間利益不一致性的存在終將難以使得一稿多投成為最後的均衡投稿規則。 This paper attempts to explore “why the journals in most academic fields like economics refuse to accept Multiple-submission (or simultaneous submission).” In this study, we use a two-stage model involving publishers and academic authors to illustrate the process of submitting, reviewing, and the submission policy determining. The first model shows an indifference result for the whole academic industry to adopt a Sole-submission or a Multiple-submission rule when authors’ utility is time-irrelevant and the reviewing delays of both journals are identical. We latter introduce the effect of differentiated refereeing delay of journals on the authors’ submission behavior in chapter 4 and show that a journal with higher prestige will refuse to adopt multiple submission rule to avoid the possibility that a faster reviewing process may give the less prestigious journal ability to “steal” high quality papers from the more prestigious one under multiple-submission. The welfare is further studied in the later sections. We calculate the overall welfare of the industry and find that even thought the current sole-submission system is not necessarily welfare superior than multiple-submission, it seems that the rigidity of the submission rule is hard to be removed due to the conflicting interests between authors and publishers.
參考文獻:	Azar, Ofer H. (2006), “The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?” American Economist, 50(1), 37-50 Coe, R. K., and I. Weinstock (1967), “Editorial Policies of Major Economic Journals,” Southern Economic Journal, 7(4), 37-43 Coupé, Tom (2004), “What do we Know about Ourselves? On the Economics of Economics,” Kyklos, 57, No. 2, 197-215 Ferber, Marianne A. and Michelle Teiman (1980), “Are Women Economists at a Disadvantage in Publishing Journal Articles?” Eastern Economics Journal, 6 , 189-193 Gordon, R. A. (1980), “The Advantage of a Simple System of Optional Published Refereeing,” Speculations in Science and Technology, 3, 607-609 Ng, Yew-Kwang (1991), “Polish and Publish: The Economics of Simultaneous Submission,” Seminar Paper, Department of Economics, Monash University Peters, Douglas P. and Stephen J. Ceci (1982), “Peer-Review Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again,” The Behavioral and Brain Science, 5(2), 187-195 Pressman, Steven (1994), “Simultaneous Multiple Journal Submission: The Case Against,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53(3), 316-333 Szenberg, Michael (1994), “Dissemination Scholarly Output: The Case for Elimination the Exclusivity of Journal Submission,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53, 303-315 Yohe, Gary W. (1980), “Current Publication Lags in Economics Journals,” Journal of Economics Literature, 18, 1050-1055 Ziman, John. (1968), Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge IIP.
描述:	碩士國立政治大學財政研究所 96255013 97
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255013
数据类型:	thesis
显示于类别:	[財政學系] 學位論文

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档案	描述	大小	格式	浏览次数
501301.pdf		101Kb	Adobe PDF2	745	检视/开启
501302.pdf		119Kb	Adobe PDF2	828	检视/开启
501303.pdf		106Kb	Adobe PDF2	798	检视/开启
501304.pdf		79Kb	Adobe PDF2	737	检视/开启
501305.pdf		82Kb	Adobe PDF2	801	检视/开启
501306.pdf		83Kb	Adobe PDF2	822	检视/开启
501307.pdf		166Kb	Adobe PDF2	854	检视/开启
501308.pdf		171Kb	Adobe PDF2	848	检视/开启
501309.pdf		240Kb	Adobe PDF2	854	检视/开启
501310.pdf		84Kb	Adobe PDF2	773	检视/开启
501311.pdf		80Kb	Adobe PDF2	796	检视/开启
501312.pdf		163Kb	Adobe PDF2	760	检视/开启

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