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    Title: 台灣家族企業的經營績效:時間序列分析
    Performance of Family Controlled Firms in Taiwan: A Time Series Analysis
    Authors: 司宇文
    Sylvain, Senechal
    Contributors: 傅冶天
    Fu, Ted
    司宇文
    Sylvain, Senechal
    Keywords: 台灣家族企業
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 20:29:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 台灣家族企業的經營績效
    This paper focuses on the performance and characteristics of Taiwan Stock Exchange listed family firms. It shows that the trend between 1997 and 2007 is for more firms to be widely held but that family firms retain their importance as a fraction of total asset. Family firms are found to be on average smaller, older and have a better return on equity than widely held firm. The better performance holds when controlling in a multivariate analysis for firm size, age and China investment.
    Family firm return on equity is not shown to present the curvilinearity of entrenchment – alignment – entrenchment associated in other studies with increasing levels of control. In a time series analysis from 1997 to 2007, there is no evidence that the better performance of family firms is a temporal effect. The ROA and ROE of family firms is better when controlling for year, asset and debt/asset.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營管理碩士班(IMBA)
    95933044
    97
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0959330442
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營管理英語碩士學程IMBA] 學位論文

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