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Title: | 中國大陸公司治理與股票報酬之關係 |
Authors: | 張亮勳 |
Contributors: | 李怡宗 張亮勳 |
Keywords: | 中國大陸上市公司 股票報酬 公司治理 四因子模式 系統風險 China’s listed companies stock returns corporate governance systematic risks |
Date: | 2007 |
Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 20:04:37 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | 本研究以中國大陸上市公司為研究對象,探討股票報酬與公司治理間之關係。此外,為了檢視中國大陸公司治理是否為股票市場上之系統風險,本研究採用學術上廣為使用之四因子模式(Carhart 1997)作為基本迴歸模型,藉由控制住影響大部分股票變異之四因子,純粹探討公司治理指標對於股票報酬之解釋能力。最後,本研究進一步比較各公司治理指標對於股票報酬變異之解釋力相對強弱為何。
實證結果發現:
(1)國家股股東持股比率相對較高、董事會規模相對較大、董事長兼任總經 理之公司具有較高股票報酬;而機構法人持股比率相對較高、公眾股股東持股比率相對較高、獨立董事占董事會比率相對較高之公司則具有較低股票報酬。
(2)絕大部分公司治理指標對於超額股票報酬具有顯著影響力,本研究進而推論中國大陸公司治理為股票市場上之系統風險之一。然而,公司治理指標對於提升四因子模式解釋力之程度相當有限。
(3)在原本四因子模式中加入「國家股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「獨立董 事占總董事人數溢酬因子」二公司治理指標,會比加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。而在模式中加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」二公司治理指標又比「機構法人持股比率溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。 This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and stock returns in China’s listed companies. Additionally, I apply four-factor model (Carhart 1997) to examine whether China’s corporate governance mechanisms are systematic risks in stock market. At last, I compare the explanation power of excess returns among all corporate governance indexes.
I find that: (1) Firms, with higher level of nation ownership, larger board size and dual roles of chairman and managing director, have higher returns; firms ,with higher level of legal person ownership, of public ownership, of independent directors’ ratio, have lower returns. (2) Most Corporate governance indexes have significant impacts on excess stock returns, so we infer that corporate governance in China is one of systematic risks in stock market. However, I also find that corporate governance indexes add few margin contributions to four-factor model. (3) Governance indexes of nation ownership and of independent directors’ ratio have more impact on stock returns than the index of public ownership and of board size. Meanwhile, index of public ownership and of board size have more impact on stock returns than the index of legal person ownership. |
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Description: | 碩士 國立政治大學 會計研究所 95353048 96 |
Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353048 |
Data Type: | thesis |
Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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