政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/36687

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/36687

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政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/36687

請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36687

題名:	Ownership, Protection, and Dividends
作者:	徐珮甄 Hsu, Pei-Chen
貢獻者:	屠美亞 Twu, Mia 徐珮甄 Hsu, Pei-Chen
關鍵詞:	Ownership Protection Dividend
日期:	2003
上傳時間:	2009-09-18 19:17:45 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本文根據32個國家的資料，觀察是否代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多股利。以股權集中度作為代理問題之代理變數，發現保護好的國家，以股權分散的公司居多，而在保護不好的國家，大部分的公司股權結構十分集中。所以在保護好的國家，主要是股東與經理人之間的代理問題，股權越分散，代理問題越大；而保護不好的國家，其主要的代理問題是介於大股東與小股東之間，股權越集中，代理問題越大。最後結論得出：在投資人保護好的國家，股利發放與股權集中度呈現正向關係；而在投資人保護差的國家，股利發放與股權集中度則呈現負向關係。代表代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多的股利，由於公司有外部融資的需求，儘管在投資人保護差的國家，公司仍會藉由發放股利來減輕代理問題。 We use a sample of companies from 32 countries around the world to shed light on the relationship between dividend payouts and insider holdings. Schooley and Barney (1994) indicate that negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership exists before a turning point; once managerial ownership exceeds the turning point, it switches to a positive one. Also, as La Porta et al. (2000) point out, legal protection causes that widely-held firms dominate in a protected environment and closely-held firms in an unprotected one. So, most research addresses a negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership. It is because their samples are usually composed of firms in a protected environment, where widely-held firms are the normality. By contrast, in countries with poor shareholder protection, closely-held companies prevail, and most of their ownership is coupled with control. Dividends thus become a tool for controlling shareholders to signal the moderation of expropriation and to reduce agency costs. Because firms with more concentrated ownership have less cost to pay dividends and need to allay the concerns about expropriation, it implies that more dividends are paid as the insider holdings increase. We surmise a positive relationship between ownership and payouts can be observed in an unprotected environment. The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis.
參考文獻:	Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1979, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and `the Bird-in-the-Hand` Fallacy, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 259-270 Carney, Michael and Eric Gedajlovic, 2002, The Coupling of Ownership and Control and the Allocation of Financial Resources: Evidence from Hong Kong, Journal of Management Studies, 39(1), 123-146 Chen, Carl R. and Thomas L. Steiner, 1999, Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy, The Financial Review, 34(1), 119-136 Claessens, Stjin, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112 Dittmar, Amy, Jan Mahrt-Smith, and Henri Servaes,, 2003, International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 111-133 D`Souza, Juliet and Atul K. Szxena, 1999, Agency Cost, Market Risk, Investment Opportunities and Dividend Policy - An International Perspective, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 35-43 Dutta, Amitabh S., 1999, Managerial Ownership, Dividend and Debt Policy in the US Banking Industry, Managerial Finance, 25(6), 57-68 Easterbrook, Frank H., 1984, Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends, The American Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659 Faccio, Mara and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365-395 Faccio, Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and Expropriation, The American Economic Review, 91(1), 54-78 Fenn, George W. and Nellie Liang, 2001, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 45-72 Gugler, Klaus, 2003, Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Policy, and the Interrelation between Dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment, Journal of Banking &Finance, 27, 1297-1321 Gugler, Klaus and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, 2003, Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germany, European Economic Review, 47, 731-758 Holder, Mark E., Frederick W. Langrehr, and J. Lawrence Hexter, 1998, Dividend Policy Determinants: An Investigation of the Influences of Stakeholder Theory, Financial Management, 27(3), 73-82 Jensen, Gerald R., Donald P. Solberg and Thomas S. Zorn, 1992, Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(2), 247-263 Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360 John, K. and J. Williams, 1985, Dividends, Dilutions, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium, Journal of Finance, 40, 1053-1070 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27 Lloyd, William P., Jahera, John S., Jr., Page, Daniel E, 1985, Agency Costs and Dividend Payout Ratios, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 24(3), 19-29 Miller, M. and K. Rock, 1985, "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, 40, 1031-1051 Rozeff, Michael S., 1982, Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Rations, Journal of Financial Research, 249-259 Schooley, Diane K., and L. Dwayne Barney Jr., 1994, Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs, Journal of Financial Research, 17(3), 363-373 Twu, Mia, 2003, Why Firms Pay Dividends and Issue Stocks Simultaneously: Ownership Concentration and Dividend Signaling Costs, Working Paper, National Chengchi University Vogt, Stephen C., 1994, The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firm, Financial Management, 23(2), 3-20
描述:	碩士國立政治大學財務管理研究所 91357017 92
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091357017
資料類型:	thesis
顯示於類別:	[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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