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    题名: 勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型
    作者: 吳依芳
    Wu ,I - Fang
    贡献者: 王智賢
    吳依芳
    Wu ,I - Fang
    关键词: 工會
    遊說
    關稅保護
    日期: 2003
    上传时间: 2009-09-18 17:36:05 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 大部份的工會遊說文獻，假設工會的目標函數受就業量與工資影響，且影響方向為正。但在真實世界中其實不僅止於此，吾人觀察國際工會運動，發現工會亦重視產品的國內價格，因此本文希望可以提出一個模型，將這個現象納入其中。本文以 Wang, Koo and Chen (2003) 的模型為基礎，加入工會對國內產品價格的關心，並探討工會和廠商的遊說行為, 將對貿易政策產生何種影響，產品的國內價格又如何變動。另外，亦嘗試找尋遊說賽局的子賽局完美均衡，並與只有廠商遊說的情況比較。
    本文發現，當參與遊說的兩部門利益方向一致，遊說標價皆落於國際價格的同一側，換句話說，不是同時高於國際價格，就是同時低於國際價格，那麼，遊說競賽的結果，不利於消費者福利。如果參與遊說的兩部門利益方向不同，其中一部門的遊說標價高於國際價格，另一部門的遊說標價則低於國際價格，只要勞工參與工會的比例大，則參與遊說的部門皆為廠商，可以提昇消費者福利；不過若是勞工參與工會的比例小，則提案的兩部門，一為廠商，一為工會，方能對消費者的福利有所增進。另外，若是聯合工會(跨產業的工會)參與遊說，消費者福利將達到最大。
    因此工會加入遊說競賽，對消費者福利是提昇還是減損並無法確定，須視勞工參與工會的比例高低及對手部門而定。不過可以肯定，聯合工會的出現，對消費者來說，不蒂是一項福音。本文乃啟發自國際工會運動事件，並由模型的結論之一可得到和現實世界一致的趨勢，雖然事實上遊說行為會比模型來的複雜許多，不過這個模型仍貼近真實世界，可得到相同的觀察。
    參考文獻: 翁永和、劉碧珍 (2001),「貿易政策、工會談判力與進口穿透 」,《人文及社會科學集刊》, 第十三卷, 第四期, 417 - 438 頁。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    91255012
    92
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255012
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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