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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35815


    Title: 最適民營化程度與政治獻金
    Authors: 林映均
    Lin, Ying Chun
    Contributors: 翁永和
    王智賢
    林映均
    Lin, Ying Chun
    Keywords: 民營化
    政治獻金
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 16:06:45 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在民主體制國家中，遊說行為往往是不可避免的，故政府在制定政策時，或多或少會受到利益團體所影響。本文以政治經濟學的觀點出發，採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 模型來探討政治獻金如何影響政府對最適民營化程度之決策。由本文之分析可知，民營化程度的高低取決於政府對於社會福利的相對重視程度 (相對於政治獻金收入)。當政府完全重視社會福利時，其所制定的最適民營化程度與傳統不考慮遊說行為下所制定的程度相同。此外，當政府某種程度上重視政治獻金時，其最適民營化程度會比沒有遊說行為下之最適民營化程度高，這說明了遊說行為的存在將促使公營事業民營化的程度更加提升。再者，隨著政府重視政治獻金的程度逐漸提高時，其最適民營化程度也會上升。當政府相對重視政治獻金的程度高於某個程度時，會產生公營事業完全民營化的現象，甚至使非常重視政治獻金的政府反而收取不到政治獻金的窘境。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟研究所
    94258002
    95
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942580021
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Economics] Theses

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