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| Title: | 財務市場資訊不對稱下之市場現象與參與者行為之研究 |
| Authors: | 謝易霖 |
| Contributors: | 陳樹衡
謝易霖 |
| Keywords: | 資訊不對稱
資訊散佈
雙方喊價市場
實驗經濟學
強化學習模型 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 16:06:20 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 財務市場資訊不對稱的現象已由不少學者研究, 本文利用真人實驗方法對此一議題再檢驗, 依照擁有資訊的程度分為: 完全知訊者、不完全知訊者與外部者。結果發現, 價格收斂情形與知訊者的多寡有顯著相關, 然而卻與知訊品質的高低相關性較低。成交量與價格收斂情形呈反向關係, 雖顯著但相關性有限, 我們推測對資產定價的落差雖是交易動機的原因之一,但並非僅只有此原因。市場內財富差異性亦與價格收斂有所相關, 價格收斂越好的市場, 市場吉尼係數就越小, 顯示參與者間貧富落差越小。與過去文獻差異較多是擁有較多資訊的參與者不見得有較好的利得,因此, 擁有資訊的程度不再是決定利得的唯一因素, 策略的選擇將是影響利潤的重要因素之一。
根據實驗結果, 發現限價單使用比例與期末利得有顯著的正相關, 且排名較為前面的參與者能較快學習到此一結果。本文將限價單使用比例的增減做為一策略選擇, 並利用三種強化學習模型解釋市場現象, 此三種模型皆從Roth 與Erev 的文獻中而來, 前二種模型中有二種參數: 新進因子與經驗因子, 新進因子表示前一期策略的動機對本期採同一策略動機的影響,經驗因子則表示前其策略所引發的利潤對本期策略動機的影響, 此一參數亦隱含了參與者強化學習之能力。第三種模型則多增加了參與者對利潤敏感的的測度。結果發現, 無論是此三種模型的何種參數, 在不同資訊結構的市場與不同類型的參與者間幾無差異。然而, 若以參與者利得的表現區分, 參與者對過去利潤的反應, 即經驗因子, 有顯著的差異, 說明了利潤高低與是否能從過去利潤結果學習到經驗(即強化學習能力) 有密切關係。上述三個現象說明, 參與者的行為參數在進入實驗室前就已決定了,因此利用市場環境與參與者身份將之分類比較的差異性不大, 但這樣的差異卻會影響之後的利得。故本文的結論與過去文獻不同的是, 在此實驗中決定參與者利得
多寡的不再是資訊掌握程度, 而是其學習(策略) 之能力。 |
| Reference: | 中文部分:
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唐恕(民87)。異質訊息下內線交易與交易策略與市場績效之研究。輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
詹場．胡星陽(2001.7)。流動性衡量方法之綜合評論。國家科學委員會研究彙刊。11卷3期。205-221。
張萬同(2003)。衍生性金融市場之管理、運作、及效率。桂冠圖書。
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
93258012
96 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0932580121 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 學位論文
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