| Reference: | Acharya, V. (2000), A theory of systemic risk and design of
prudential bank regulation, Unabridged version, Working
Paper, Stern School of Business, New York University.
Barber, J. R., C. Chang, and D. C. Thurston (1996), Bank
failure, risk, and capital regulation. Journal of Economics
and Finance 120(3)：13-20.
Bencivenga, V. R., and B. D. Smith (1991), Financial
intermediation and endogenous growth. Review of Economic
Studies 58：195-09.
Bryant, J. (1980), A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit
insurance, Journal of Banking and Finance 4：335-44.
Calomiris, C., and G., Gorton (1991), The origins of banking
panics, models, facts, and bank regulation, in Glenn Hubbard,
ed.: Financial Markets and Financial Crisis (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.).
Campbell, T. S., Y. S. Chan, and A.M. Marino (1992), An
incentive-based theory of bank regulation.Journal of
Financial Intermediation 2：255-76.
Chan, Y., S. Greenbaum, and A. Thakor (1992), Is fairly priced
deposit insurance possible? Journal of Finance 4：227-45.
Chari, V.V., and R. Jagannathan (1988), Banking panics,
information, and rational expectations equilibrium, Journal
of Finance 43：749-60.
Chen, Y. (1999), Banking Panic：The role of the first-come,
first-served rule and information Externalities, The Journal
of Political Economy, 107（5）：946-68.
Cooper R., and T. W. Ross (1991), Bank runs: iquidity and
incentives, NBER Working Paper No.3921, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Diamond, D., and P. Dybvig (1983), “Bank runs, deposit
insurance, and liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy 105：
928-56.
Freixas, X., B. Parigi and J. C. Rochet (1998), Lender of last
resort policy: a theoretical foundation, unpublished
manuscript, Universities Pompeu Fabra, Toulouse and Venice.
Furlong, F. T., and M. C. Keeley (1989), Capital requirement
and banking risk-taking：a note.Journal of Banking and
Finance 13(6)：883-91.
Gorton, G. (1985), Bank suspension of convertibility, Journal
of Monetary Economics 15, 177-193.
Gorton, G. (1988), Banking panics and business cycles. Oxford
Economic Papers 40.
Hellwig, M. (1995), Systemic aspects of risk management in
banking and finance. Swiss Journal of Economics and
Statistics 131(4/2)：723-37.
Herring, R. and P. Vankudre (1987), Growth opportunities and
risk-taking by financial intermediaries, The Journal of
Finance 42(3)：583-99.
Humphrey T. (1986), The Classical Concept of the Lender of Last
Resort in Essays on Inflation, 5th ed., edited by T.
Humphrey, Richmond, Va, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Jacklin, C. J. and S. Bhattacharya, (1988), Distinguishing
panics and information-based bank runs:welfare and policy
implications, Journal of Political Economy 96：568-92.
Kahane, Y. (1977), Capital adequacy and the regulation of
financial intermediaries. Journal of Banking and Finance 1
(2)：207-17.
Kandori, M., G. J. Mailath and R. Rafael (1993), Learning,
mutation, and long run equilibrium in games. Econometrica 61
(1)：29-56.
Klein, M. (1971), A theory of the banking firm. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 3：205-18.
Koehn, M. and A. Santomero (1980), Regulation of bank capital
and portfolio risk. Journal of Finance 35(5)：1235-44.
Merton, R. C. (1977), An analytic derivation of the cost of
deposit insurance and loan guarantees. Journal of banking and
finance 1(1)：3-11.
Mishkin F. (1995), Comments on systemic risk, in G. Kaufman ed.
Banking Financial Markets and Systemic Risk, Research in
Financial Services, Private and Public Policy, Vol. 7,Hampton,
JAI press Inc.
Ringbom S., O. Shy, and R. Stenbacka (2004), Optimal liquidity
management and bail-out policy in the banking industry.
Journal of Banking and Finance 28(6)：1319-35.
Robert, A., (1984), The evolution of cooperation, New York.
Rochet, J. C. (1992), Capital requirement and the behavior of
commercial banks. European Economic Review 36：1137-78.
Rochet , J. C., and J. Tirole. (1996), Interbank lending and
systemic risk. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28(4)：
733-62.
Samuelson, L.(1997), Evolutionary games and equilibrium
selection, Cambridge, Mass.：MIT Press,
Santomero and Hoffman (1998), Problem Bank Resolution:
Evaluating the Options, D.P 98-05, Financial Institutions
Center, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Schaffer, M. E. (1988), Evolutionarily stable strategies for a
finite population and a variable contest size. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 132：469-78.
Schwartz, A. (1995), Systemic Risk and the Macroeconomy, in G.
Kaufman ed. Banking Financial Markets and Systemic Risk,
Research in Financial Services, Private and Public Policy,
Vol. 7, Hampton, JAI press Inc.
Sharpe, W. (1964), Capital asset prices：A theory of market
equilibrium under condition s of risk. Journal of Finance 19：
425-42.
Smith, J., M., and G. R. Price (1973), The logic of animal
conflict. Nature 246：15-18.
Smith, J., M., (1982), Evolution and the theory of games.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Staub, M. (1998), Inter-banken-kredite und systemisches risiko.
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 134(2)：193-230.
Tanaka, Y. (2000), A finite population ESS and a long run
equilibrium in an n players coordination game. Mathematical
Social Sciences 39：195-206.
Temzelides, T. (1997), Evolution, coordination, and banking
panics. Journal of monetary economics 40：163-83. |
