| Reference: | 參 考 文 獻
曹添旺、張文雅 (1999)，「金融危機的研究及其對台灣的啟示—兼論未來的研究方向」，台灣經濟預測與政策，30，91-102。
賴景昌 (1994)，國際金融理論：進階篇，台北：茂昌出版社。
賴景昌 (2001)，總體經濟學，台北：雙葉書廊。
賴景昌 (2002)，「時序不一致」，上課講義。
賴景昌 (2002)，「第二代的匯率制度變革」，上課講義。
Agenor, P. R., Bhandari, J. S. and Flood, R. P. (1992), “Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” IMF Staff Papers, 39, 357-394.
Barro, R. J. and Gordon, D. B. (1983), “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589-610.
Buiter, W. H. (1987), “Borrowing to Defend the Exchange Rate and the Timing of and Magnitude of Speculative Attacks,” Journal of International Economics, 23, 221-239.
Chortareas, G. E. and Miller, S. M. (2003), “Monetary Policy and Delegation, Contracts Costs and Contract Targets,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 55, 101-112.
Djajic, S. (1989), “Dynamics of Exchange Rate in Anticipation of Pegging,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 8, 559-571.
Drazen, A. and Masson, P. R. (1994), “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policy Makers ,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 735-754.
Flood, R. P. and Garber, P. M. (1984), “Collapsing Exchange-Rate-Regimes: Some Linear Examples,” Journal of International Economics, 17, 1-13.
Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1997), “Policy Implications of “Second Generation” Crises Models,” International Monetary Fund, 44, 383-390.
Flood, R. P. and Marion N. P. (1998), “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crises,” NBER Working Paper, No. 6380.
Garfinkel, M. R. and Oh, S. (1993), “Stategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons,” American Economic Review, 83, 99-117.
Gartner, M. (2000), “Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 14, 527-561.
Krugman, P. (1979), “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11, 311-325.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977), “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.
Lohmann, S. (1992), “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility,” American Economic Review, 82, 273-286.
Meon, P. G. (2001), “A Model of Exchange Rate Crises with Partisan Governments,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 23, 517-535.
Meon, P. G. and Razzo J. M. (2002), “The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate and Empirical Investigation,” Open Economic Review, 13, 111-132.
Obstfeld, M. (1984), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Devaluation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, 208-217.
Obstfeld, M. (1994), “The Logic of Currency Crises,” Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, 43, 189-213.
Obstfeld, M. (1996), “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features,” European Economic Review, 40, 1037-1047.
Rangvid, J. (2001), “Second Generation Models of Currency Crises,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 613-646.
Rogoff, K. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Targets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.
Svensson, L. E. O. (1997), “Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,” American Economic Review, 87, 98-114.
Velasco, A. (1996), “Fixed Exchange Rates: Credibility, Flexibility, and Multiplicity,” European Economic Review, 40, 1023-1035.
Waller, C. J. (1992), “The Choice of a Conservative Central Bank in a Multisector Economy,” American Economic Review, 82, 1006-1012.
Walsh, C. E. (1995), “Optimal Contracts for Central Banks,” American Economic Review, 85, 150-167.
Willman, A. (1988), “Balance-of-Payments Crises and Monetary Policy Reactions in a Model with Imperfect Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Bonds,” Economics Letters, 26, 77-81. |
