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    題名: 跨國企業移轉計價-動態最適化模型
    Multinational Firm Transfer Pricing Under Dynamic Optimization
    作者: 謝孟釗
    Hsieh,Meng-Chao
    貢獻者: 林柏生
    Lin,Po-Sheng
    謝孟釗
    Hsieh,Meng-Chao
    關鍵詞: 移轉價格
    租稅競爭
    懲罰
    跨國企業
    動態最適化
    常規交易原則
    Transfer Price
    Tax Competition
    Penalty
    MNF(MNE)
    Dynamic Optimization
    Arm`s Length Standard
    日期: 2003
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 14:08:06 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 臺灣現有移轉計價之規範未有明確的罰則(Penalty)，因而衍生許多稅負規避的問題。本文採用動態最適化(Dynamic Optimization)的模型來觀察跨國企業移轉計價的行為，在面臨懲罰與兩國稅差時企業會如何利用移轉價格及數量來進行獲利移轉以規避稅負，進而分析政府調降稅率以降低稅差並吸引獲利移轉的稅率政策對企業移轉計價的影響，最後再探討罰則在法規制定上的必要性。結果顯示，預料到的稅率政策在長期能有效減少企業從事移轉價格操弄(Transfer Price Manipulation)，但在短期﹝除了宣告那一刻之外﹞反而更助長移轉價格操弄的發生，特別是當政策宣告至執行之期間過長時更為嚴重。此外，由先前的文獻可知無罰則下的最適移轉價格為一邊界解(Boundary Solution)，本文也證明了此邊界解亦可能出現於有罰則的情況下。然而，罰則的存在創造了內部解(Interior Solution)的可能性，此內部解較邊界解更趨近於常規交易價格，因此我們仍建議政府制定罰則。
    This paper employs a dynamic optimization model to determine the equilibrium price and quantity in a multinational firm (MNF) faced with a threat of a penalty. We analyze the impact on transfer pricing that arises from the unanticipated and anticipated permanent taxation policy of home country and host country. Anticipated taxation policy for reducing tax differentials can reduce transfer price manipulation in the long term. However, except for the moment of announcement, such reduction of transfer price manipulation does not occur in the short term, especially in the case of a large time lag of policy. We also show that the boundary solution is possible even though transfer price penalty exists and suggest that governments impose penalty which creates the possibility of interior solution.
    參考文獻: Bloch F., Lefebvre E., 1999, Corporate tax competition, tariffs, and multinational firms, Economics Letters 65, 221-225.
    Bond E. W., 1980, Optimal transfer pricing when tax rates differ, Southern Economic Journal 47.1, 191-200.
    Chang F. K., Tu C. Y., 2004, Issues of transfer pricing and how to deal with them, Deloitte & Touche.
    Copithorne L., 1971, International corporate transfer prices and government policy, Canadian Journal of Economics 4, 324-341.
    Dawson P. C., Miller S. M., 2000, Transfer pricing in the decentralized multinational corporation, Working Paper.
    Devadoss S., 1997, Price determination in a bilateral monopoly, Working Paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Idaho.
    Devadoss S., Cooper K., 2000, Simultaneous price and quantity determination in a joint profit maximizing bilateral monopoly under dynamic optimization, International Economic Journal 14, 71-84.
    Diewert W. E., 1985, Transfer pricing and economic efficiency, in: A.M. Rugman and L. Eden, eds., Multinationals and transfer pricing (St. Martin’s New York), 47-81.
    Eden L., 1985, The microeconomics of transfer pricing, in: A.M. Rugman and L. Eden, eds., Multinationals and transfer pricing (St. Martin’s New York), 13-46.
    Elitzur R., Mintz J., 1996, Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition, Journal of Public Economics 60, 401-422.
    Haufler A., Schjelderup G., 2000, Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting, Oxford Economic Papers 52, 306-325.
    Host T., 1971, The theory of the multinational firm: optimal behavior under different tariff and tax rates, Journal of Political Economy 79, 1059-1072.
    Kamien M. I., Schwartz N. L., 1991, Dynamic optimization: the calculus of variations and optimal control in economics and management, 2nd ed., New York: Elsevier Science.
    Kant C., 1988, Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation, Journal of International Economics 24, 147-157.
    Kel, 2003, Lectures on Public Finance Part1_Chap9, 2003 version.
    Korn E., Lengsfeld S., 2003, Duopolistic competition, taxes, and the arm’s length principle, Working Paper.
    Samuelson L., 1982, The multinational firm with arm’s length transfer price limits, Journal of International Economics 13, 365-374.
    Takayama A., 1993, Analytical methods in economics, The University of Michigan Press.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易研究所
    91351012
    92
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091351012
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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