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    題名: 不對稱組織間交易關係之統治
    Governance in asymmetric buyer-seller relationships
    作者: 康敏平
    Kang, Min-Ping
    貢獻者: 司徒達賢
    于卓民
    Seetoo, Dah-Hsian
    Yu, Chwo-Ming
    康敏平
    Kang, Min-Ping
    關鍵詞: 關係專屬投資
    製造代工
    事後保護策略
    依賴程度
    不對稱組織間關係
    relation-specific investment
    OEM
    ex post safeguard strategy
    dependency
    asymmetric interorganizational relationship
    日期: 2005
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 13:36:28 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 代工廠商承接訂單時，為特定品牌客戶投資各種專屬的設備和人力是普遍存在的現象。相較之下，台灣的代工廠商處於相對弱勢的地位。代工廠商並不容易在交易初期就從品牌客戶端，取得對等的保護機制，故契約的執行的風險也相對升高。但實務上，我們發現台灣的代工廠商在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，卻仍持續為特定客戶投資。如果代工廠商必須先承諾關係專屬投資，才能爭取得到訂單。在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，代工廠商該有那些配套措施，來保護交易關係？
    本研究以代工廠商角度，探討如何透過交易後的保護策略，改變代工廠商與客戶之間的依賴關係。本研究根據交易成本理論和權力依賴理論推論，代工廠商傾向先承諾關係專屬投資，並於交易後採取事後保護策略。事後保護策略有兩類，分別是槓桿策略（資源獲取、擴大客戶範疇）和連結策略（擴大垂直範疇、共同決策與行動）。槓桿策略企圖降低代工廠商的依賴程度；連結策略則會提高客戶的依賴程度。藉由代工廠商與品牌客戶之間的權力變化，進而保護關係專屬投資免於套牢的威脅。
    本研究分三個子研究進行，分別為（1）探索性個案研究、（2）關係專屬投資量表發展、（3）問卷調查研究。第一、探索性個案研究發現，不對稱的組織間關係使得代工廠商必須配合品牌客戶的需求而承諾關係專屬投資，但在「小對大」的格局之下，較為弱勢的代工廠商仍有具有生存空間。個案研究發現代工廠商對品牌客戶的投資，除了單一交易的成本與利益之外，還會考量對未來交易以及其他交易對象的影響。所謂「將欲奪之，必固與之」，代工廠商透過關係專屬投資被整合到產業的價值網絡中，換取廠商的生存機會。
    第二、關係專屬投資量表發展研究發現，關係專屬投資為一多構面構念，可分為「實體資產投資」、「無形資產投資」和「資產專屬程度」三個次構念。由此可知，關係專屬投資既是一種資產，有助於交易關係之維持；也可能成為負債，限於少數交易的困境。
    第三、本研究整合交易成本理論和權力依賴理論，並根據個案研究和量表發展結果，推論關係專屬投資程度、事後保護策略、依賴程度三者之間的關係。問卷調查研究證實，代工廠商對品牌客戶的無形 資產投資會增加代工廠商的依賴程度。但如果代工廠商投資之後，採取資源獲取策略。藉由品牌客戶的背書，提升知名度或市場地位，則關係專屬投資與代工廠商依賴程度之間的關係就會減弱。另外，關係專屬投資也會提高客戶對代工廠商的依賴程度。投資實體資產和無形資產的代工廠商，會藉由擴大服務範疇，與客戶共同決策與行動，來提高客戶依賴程度。
    In original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-supplier relationships, OEM suppliers commonly make investments that are specialized to the requirements of a particular buyer. Taiwanese OEM suppliers are small-medium firms with limited resources and low in market visibility. They are initially in a weak bargaining position, so they have no ability to vertical integrate or demand any kind of ex ante safeguards at all. Knowing that clients may have opportunistic behaviors, suppliers in Taiwan still make relation-specific investments for them without their commitments. How do these suppliers governance the asymmetric interorganizational relationships to avoid falling into the trap predicted by the transaction cost theory?
    This study takes the view of a supplier, the small party in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationship, who adopts ex post strategies to create inter-organizational dependency with OEMs. According to transaction cost theory and power dependency theory, we argue that OEM suppliers are more likely to make relation-specific investments first and follow by ex post strategies. We model the ex post strategies adopted by OEM suppliers to protect specific investments in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationships by using leveraging strategy (resource acquisition, customer scope) and bonding strategy (vertical scope, joint action). Leveraging strategies will lower the level of suppliers’ dependence on OEMs while bonding strategy will increase the level of OEMs’ dependence on suppliers.
    We conducted three studies to explore the issues: (1) exploratory case research; (2) scale development of the construct of relation-specific investment; (3) survey research. First, we found that investment decision of small party is beyond the scope of a single transaction. After making relation-specific investments, OEM suppliers redeploy their resources and work closely with their buyers to maintain exiting and future transactions. They also acquire strategic resources from OEMs and apply them to a broader customer base.
    Second, the concept of relation-specific investment is a multidimensional construct with three sub-dimensions as tangible investment, intangible investment, and asset specificity. Relation-specific investments create an inherent dilemma because they have the potential both to promote and reduce transaction cost for investing parties.
    Third, we integrated two theories to explore the relationships between relation-specific investment, ex post strategies, and dependency. According to survey results of 146 OEM suppliers in Taiwan, we confirmed the positive relationship between suppliers’ intangible asset investment and their dependency on OEMs. However, if suppliers leverage their clients’ reputations and reposition themselves as first-tier suppliers, they can lower the level of suppliers’ dependency due to their relation-specific investments. On the other hand, the more relation-specific investments suppliers make, the morel likely suppliers would adopt bonding strategy by expanding vertical scope in supply chain and by actively involving in joint decision making. We found that relation-specific investment itself and suppliers’ bonding strategy will increase the OEMs’ dependency on suppliers.
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