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    題名: 擁擠成本對地方政府財政競爭的影響
    作者: 邱重威
    貢獻者: 蔡智發
    邱重威
    關鍵詞: 基礎建設
    擁擠成本
    不配成本
    財政競爭
    水平差異
    日期: 2005
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 11:04:36 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Justman et al. (2001) 探究在彼此競爭的情況下，地方政府如何提供具有水平差異特質的基礎建設。該文得到兩地政府會盡量提供具有差異化的基礎建設，以避免陷入財政競爭的窘境。
    本研究將擁擠成本放入上述模型修正，主要獲致三個結果。首先，在單一地方政府沒有競爭的情況下，地方政府提供單一基礎建設與兩種基礎建設相較，當政府提供兩種基礎建設，土地價值較大，故在沒有競爭的情況下，政府應該提供兩種基礎建設；其次，在兩個地方政府各提供單一基礎建設的競爭模型下，政府提供差異極大基礎建設種類的決策不會受到擁擠成本的影響，然而當兩地政府都提供相同的基礎建設時，廠商是沒有辦法利用政府彼此的競爭，而將在地區創造的所有利益都拿走；另外，在廠商群總數相同下，地方政府應該選擇基礎建設需求種類較多的廠商群，差異化仍主導了基礎建設決策的結果；最後，在一地政府提供兩種基礎建設，另一地提供單一基礎建設競爭模型中，若不考量擁擠成本，可以發現提供兩個基礎建設的地方政府，最終都沒有誘因願意去提供兩個基礎競爭來與提供單一基礎建設的另一地競爭，故在有競爭的情況下，地方政府應該會提供單一基礎建設。加入擁擠成本之後，可以發現當擁擠成本越大時，對地方政府而言，越可以紓解財政競爭張力，在基礎建設種類決策中兩地提供的基礎建設種類有逐漸相互趨近的情況。
    參考文獻: Bjorvatn, K. (2000), “Urban Infrastructure and Industrialization,” Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 205-218.
    Bonanno, J. (1987), “Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence,” The Review of Economic Studies, 54, 37-45.
    Brueckner, J. K. (1983). “Property Value Maximization and Public Sector Efficiency,” Journal of Urban Economics, 14, 1-16.
    Buchanan, J. M. (1965), “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica, 33, 1-14.
    Caminal, R. (2004), “Personal Redistribution and the Regional Allocation of Public Investment,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34, 55-69.
    Cummings, R. and W. D. Schulze (1978), “Optimal Investment Strategy for Boomtowns: A Theoretical Analysis,” American Economic Review, 374-385.
    d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979), “On Hotelling’s Stability in Competition,” Econometrica, 47, 1145-1150.
    Gramlich, E. M. (1994), “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, 1176-1196.
    Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.
    Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2001), “Fiscal Competition and Regional Differentiation,” Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics Papers, No. 0124.
    Justman, M., Thisse, J.-F. and T. van Ypersele (2002), “Taking the Bite Out of Fiscal Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 52, 294-315.
    Keen, M., and M. Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33-53.
    Lambertini, L. (1997), “Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly,” Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 407-420.
    Lynde, C. and J. Richmond (1992), “The Role of Public Capital in Production,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 37-44.
    Mansoorian, A., and G. M. Myers (1997), “On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations,” Journal of Public Economics, 63, 265-281.
    Martinez-Giralt, X., and D. J. Neven (1988), “Can Price Competition Dominate Market Segmentation?,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 431-442.
    Mayeres, I. and S. Proost (1997), “Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99, 261-279.
    Meiburg, C. O. (1963), “An Economic Analysis of Highway Services,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 648-656.
    Philips, L. and J.-F. Thisse (1982), “Spatial Competition and the Theory of Differentiated Markets: An Introduction,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 1-9.
    Salant, S. W., Switzer, S. and R. Reynolds (1983), “Loses from Horizontal Merger: the Effect of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,185-213.
    Scotchmer, S. (1986), “Local Public Goods in an Equilibrium: How Pecuniary Externalities Matter,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16, 463-481.
    Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.
    Wooders, M. (1978), “Equilibria, the Core, And Jurisdiction Structures in Economies with a Local Public Good,” Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 328-348.
    溫世仁 (2003)，《溫世仁觀點：中國經濟的未來》，台北市：天下遠見。
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    92255006
    94
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550061
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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