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    Title: 京都議定書之清潔發展機制研究
    Authors: 戴天麗
    Tai, Tien-li
    Contributors: 林其昂
    Lin, Chi-ang
    戴天麗
    Tai, Tien-li
    Keywords: 京都議定書
    清潔發展機制
    國際公共財
    Kyoto Protocol
    Clean Development Mechanism
    International Public Goods
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 11:04:01 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文採文獻歸納方式,針對全球暖化問題,以國際公共財理論作為議題緣起,分析京都彈性機制—清潔發展機制之運作。全球暖化為一純粹國際公共財問題。而京都議定書要求各國履行排放減量之標的,可作為提供公共財依據。並以排放減量份額作為供給數量之評估。而CDM即為促進各國均能參與溫室氣體減量活動之機制,達成經濟永續發展之目標。
    當就不對稱關係以賽局討論國際公共財之供給,邊際成本較低國家,應從事較多公共財貢獻行動;邊際成本較高的國家則發生搭便車行為。但卻與CDM文獻結論有所不同。CDM計畫中的開發中國家因不受約束,反而有搭便車行為。多數的減量行動仍由已開發國家在境內進行。故國際公共財賽局可否用於研究CDM之運作,仍有待評估。
    有關CDM在模型理論上可利用動態規劃之最適模型,研究投資國與被投資國之行為。當排放權證交易為不完全競爭市場時,可以Stackelberg模型進行。若不僅以經濟分析,尚可加入生態研究作成整合模型。在CDM執行成效方面,必須審慎評估CDM計畫型式,並考量是否合乎額外性準則。而CERs之境內分配政策,則可能會因利益交換,導致勾結行為相繼發生。此外,排放基線與CERs具有密切關聯,基線設定遂成為CDM之核心議題。有效建立CDM法則,強化合作的透明度,對於減少交易成本將佔有關鍵性地位。又CERs以選擇權出售;CDM與IIA的衝突及CDM資訊不對稱問題,都可再作研究。
    儘管台灣非京都議定書締約國,無法作為CDM之地主國。僅能間接參與投資。不過國內學者多已提出產業因應措施作為諮詢。並以TAIGEM-E模型推算排放基線,建立從事溫室氣體減量行動之數據。受限於台灣國際地位,CDM計畫成效可能難以進行實證分析。不過中國和日本有許多CDM計畫,可針對較具爭議性之議題作延伸討論,並研讀相關文獻作為參考。本文即為發掘核心議題,提供文獻彙整,協助擬研究清潔發展機制者作為參議。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    92255003
    94
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550031
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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