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    题名: 框架與逃漏稅--展望理論在教師課稅問題之研究
    作者: 王惠屏
    贡献者: 吳家恩
    王惠屏
    关键词: 框架
    展望理論
    逃漏稅
    日期: 2003
    上传时间: 2009-09-18 11:03:34 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 　　目前台灣的所得稅法規定中小學以下的教師薪資所得免稅，政府為了達到量能課稅之公平原則，於是研擬提出教師取消免稅與加薪同步，即收多少稅就加多少薪資的策略，以讓教師在課稅前後的實質所得不變，藉以減少教師人員的反彈。本文的目的在於探討對中小學以下教師課稅又加薪的框架限制下，即政府在維持對教師課稅前後的教師淨所得不變，分析是否會讓中小學以下教師有逃漏稅的誘因，而使政府補貼教師薪資的美意喪失，而導致政府及全民的損失。因為政府要以加薪來彌補教師因課稅後所短少的所得，以順利進行取消免稅優惠措施之前，必須還要考量課稅又加薪後是否會因此而使財政收入不增反減。

    　　本文研究發現，在預期效用理論下，若教師在舊制度的淨所得的效用滿足小於新制度逃漏稅的預期效用，則加薪又課稅的新制度實施下，教師就會因此而產生逃漏稅行為。此時，政府可藉由提高罰款倍率或查核率，以讓教師的逃漏稅減少。而在展望理論下，政府除了可藉由提高查核率外，還可使用提高扣繳金額的手段來減少教師逃漏稅的誘因；再者，政府若將處罰標的改為逃漏所得額，會比處罰標的為逃漏稅額更易減少教師逃漏稅的誘因；此外，扣除額的增加也會增加教師的依從。因此，本文認為政府在維持收支平衡下，想要以加薪來取消教師免稅的理想可能將無法達成，而且會造成比政策實施前更嚴重的稅收損失現象。更進一步地分析，除非，政府有能力在實施提高扣繳率、查核率或扣除額的補救措施的情況下，能確保不引起人民情緒上的反彈，如此才能有效降低教師的逃漏稅意願，否則，政府對於課稅又加薪的政策應再做評估。
    參考文獻: 一、中文部分
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    91255025
    92
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912550251
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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