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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34737


    Title: 族群分化與公共財之提供
    Authors: 陳美慈
    CHEN,MEI-TZU
    Contributors: 曾巨威
    陳美慈
    CHEN,MEI-TZU
    Keywords: 族群分化
    公共財
    社會分化
    族群分裂
    異質性偏好
    ethnic division
    public good
    ethnic diversity
    ethnic fragmentation
    heterogeneous preference
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 11:02:49 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近幾年來,在國際場合或在我國政治運作中,「族群融和」議題常被提出做為討論。觀察世界各國族群分化的狀況,我們發現社會存在族群分化問題會造成資源使用的不效率、經濟成長緩慢、政府政策效能低落等。其中,就公共政策來看,主要問題為公共財提供的數量及型態,會產生扭曲的現象。Bridgman(2004)利用租稅制度的選擇,解釋在族群互動下,公共財總量提供的問題。該文提出,只要允許族群有政策工具的選擇空間,則優勢族群必會剝奪其他族群資源以追求自身利益最大,導致公共財提供的扭曲與不效率,造成社會分化與公共財之間的問題。
    本文以Bridgman(2004)文章為基礎,將「不同族群對公共財有不同的偏好反應」的因子,納入基本模型中。利用「公共財型態選擇機制」顯示不同族群面對相同公共財數量時,主觀的偏好反應在公共財效用差異上,使模型更臻完整。本文利用兩階段賽局方式,分別求取公共財型態均衡解與公共財數量及租稅政策的均衡解。透過均衡解的分析可發現,當族群對公共財型態有偏好差異時,公共財數量受到社會分化程度的衝擊愈大,亦即數量減少幅度較Bridgman(2004)模型結果更大,族群支付租稅的意願更低。而且,透過均衡解也可發現,當族群對公共財型態存在偏好差異,會更進一步的使公共財數量下降。此乃因族群偏好的差異透過族群間不公平的制度對待,加深了社會分化程度,更進一步減少公共財提供與資源使用效率。故政府制定相關政策時,應將族群問題納入考量,以期有更完善、公平的族群融和、社會穩定的發展。
    Reference: Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore (1997), “ On the Number and Size of Nation ”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.4, PP.1027-1056.
    Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999), “ Public goods and Ethnic Divisions ”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.114, No.4, PP.1243-1284.
    Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (2000), “ Redistributive Public Employment ”, Journal of Urban Econmics, Vol.48, PP.219-241.
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    Description: 國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    91255004
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912550041
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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