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    題名: 公共經濟學三篇論文
    Three Essays on Public Economics
    作者: 許耕維
    Hsu,Keng-Wei
    貢獻者: 楊建成
    許耕維
    Hsu,Keng-Wei
    關鍵詞: 中位數投票者
    公共基金邊際成本
    資訊不對稱
    道德冒險
    逆選擇
    風險分攤
    管制機制
    利潤稅
    最適租稅
    日期: 2006
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 11:02:16 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 第一篇文章係利用Meltzer and Richard (1981)所建構之中位數投票者模型，衡量政府進行所得重分配產生公共基金邊際成本大小。有別於過去研究公共基金邊際成本的文獻，假設租稅制度之現況為任意的或是在最適的均衡下，文章的主要貢獻在利用現存租稅制度本身代表著一個政治均衡的前題，推導出公共基金邊際成本之公式，故可以視為是將實證經濟學的特性應用在規範經濟學的領域之研究。有趣的是公式中以標準化後平均所得與中位數所得差距所衡量的所得不均度，可以用來衡量租稅的效率損失及重分配水準是否足夠。
    第二篇文章係利用 Laffont and Tirole(1986)的最適廠商管制機制模型，加入Raith(2003)誘因給付契約模型，建構較符合實際社會狀況的雙層不完全資訊模型。文章的貢獻在發現廠商最適管制機制，除Laffont and Tirole（1986）指出受廠商工作努力誘因及資訊淨租之影響外，還受到員工風險厭惡程度、生產成本風險及工作努力邊際負效用增加速度等因素的影響。當生產成本風險愈高，或是員工風險厭惡程度愈大及工作努力邊際效用增加速度愈快，使得廠商與員工間道德冒險的成本愈大時，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向成本加成契約，而非Laffont and Tirole(1986)指出偏向固定價格契約。此結論可廣泛應用於包括國防採購、政府部門與公有、公用事業之管控等問題，例如，航太、軍火、高速鐵路等生產成本風險較高產業，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向成本加成契約；但電力、自來水等生產成本風險較低產業，廠商最適管制機制愈偏向固定價格契約。
    第三篇文章討論過去文獻未分析的廠商最適利潤稅問題。廠商的實際利潤除有生產技術的差異外，還受員工工作努力及隨機變數等因素的影響。一方面，政府僅能觀察廠商事後利潤，並無法觀察其生產技術差異；另一方面，廠商也無法觀察員工工作努力及隨機變數等，兩者均存在不完全資訊的問題，因此，建構政府與廠商之間，以及廠商與員工之間的雙層不完全資訊架構，分析不同生產技術廠商的最適利潤稅對逆選擇、道德冒險及風險分攤的影響，是一個有趣且重要的課題。
    本篇發現廠商最適利潤稅有兩種情況，當政府觀察廠商事後利潤不會產生替代效果下，應課徵定額稅(lump-sum taxes)；除此之外，若存在逆選擇的問題，透過模擬數值分析結果發現，廠商最適利潤稅邊際稅率與員工風險厭惡程度及生產風險成正比。此外，隨著廠商生產技術愈高，利潤稅邊際稅率則逐漸下降，而且廠商生產技術愈高，不同風險厭惡程度及風險下的利潤稅邊際稅率差異也逐漸減少。
    當生產技術分配為柏拉圖(Pareto)分配時，最適廠商利潤稅邊際稅率較均等(Uniform)分配及對數常態(Lognormal)分配為低。當工作努力邊際效用與工作努力間為凸函數時，最適廠商利潤稅邊際稅率較兩者間為線性函數時為低。
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    88255501
    95
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0882555011
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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