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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34731


    Title: 不對稱資訊下最適所得稅與租稅逃漏及查核策略之研究
    Authors: 吳佩凌
    Contributors: 楊建成
    吳佩凌
    Keywords: 資訊不對稱
    最適所得稅
    兩階段查核策略
    租稅逃漏
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 11:01:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去有關最適所得稅理論、所得稅逃漏問題、以及政府最適稽查策略的研究文獻，主要多建立在政府與納稅人間存在著資訊不對稱的假設下。本文將此處所謂資訊不對稱，區分為兩種類別的問題：第一種類別是指政府對納稅人獲取所得的能力與勞動供給皆無法得知，但卻可以在無需花費任何成本的情況下，完全掌握到納稅人的所得水準。第二個類別則是指政府不僅無法掌握納稅人的能力與勞動供給，也必須透過查核方能掌握到納稅人的所得水準，而查核工作通常必須付出稽查成本。
    本文主要的研究目的，在探討前述第二種類別的資訊不對稱問題
    ，如何影響最適所得稅理論、政府稽查策略、以及納稅人逃漏行為等。至於研究架構則分為兩大部分，第一部份是將第二種類別的資訊不對稱問題納入最適所得稅的研究之中。我們主要的重點在於探討當稽查機率並非政府事前政策變數，且政府的稽查策略與納稅人的逃漏稅行為是互為影響時，最適所得稅理論的分析結論，究竟如何改變。第二部分則是探討實務上常見的兩階段查核方式，對政府稽查策略與納稅人申報行為的影響，並比較其與直接隨機查核策略的差異。在此所謂的兩階段查核，是指政府在第一階段先根據以往稽查經驗，分析具逃漏稅傾向者的所得來源或特徵，並藉此建立篩選標準，以對納稅人進行選案分析，俾篩選出具有較高傾向可能從事特定逃漏稅行為的納稅人。其次，再從第一階段篩選出的納稅人，以不同機率或查核方式來進行第二階段的隨機查核。
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    87255501
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0872555012
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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