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| Title: | 污染管制與政治獻金
Polliution Contral and Political Contrihbutions |
| Authors: | 林惠敏
Lin,Hui-Min |
| Contributors: | 王智賢
Wang,Jue-Shyan
林惠敏
Lin,Hui-Min |
| Keywords: | 污染管制
利益團體
政治獻金
pollution control
interest groups
political contributions |
| Date: | 2006 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 10:59:00 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 利益團體影響政府政策的制定，在各國均時有所聞。本文主要探討當政府面對利益團體的政治獻金操作時，在謀求社會福利水準極大下，將如何影響污染管制政策的制定。藉由 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立之政治獻金模型為架構，分析利益團體如何藉由政治獻金的捐獻來達成影響政府制定最適污染管制政策的目的；並藉由此一模型分析政府如何在考量政治獻金的收入下，訂定最適污染管制政策。我們發現廠商及一般民眾所提供政治獻金的多寡及最適污染標準的高低，受到政府對全國福利水準重視的程度，及一般民眾組成利益團體的人數所影響。當一般民眾組成利益團體的人數愈多時，政府制定之最適污染標準將愈趨於嚴格，尤其全體民眾組成一共同利益團體時，最適污染標準值將與未收受政治獻金時之數值相等。然而一般而言，政府所制定最適污染標準值卻是較有利於廠商。
This paper analyzes how the interest groups use political contributions to influence the government optimal control policy of pollution. We find that both the optimal control of the pollution and the amount of political contributions are affected by the weight that the domestic government puts on the social welfare and the population. When the weight is larger, the political contributions of interest groups will become smaller. Secondly, the more people pay attention to pollution, the more strict the optimal control of the pollution will be. Moreover, in general, the optimal control of the pollution tends to favor the manufacturer. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
94255006
95 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094255006 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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