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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34700


    Title: 租稅歸宿與最適公共財提供條件－租稅競爭模型
    Tax Incidence and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods－Tax Competition Model
    Authors: 陳佳鈴
    Chen, Chia-Ling
    Contributors: 張勝文
    Chang, Sheng-Wen
    陳佳鈴
    Chen, Chia-Ling
    Keywords: 租稅競爭
    Tiebout 模型
    最適公共財提供條件
    租稅歸宿
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 10:57:40 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 　　本文以Tiebout（1956）及Zodrow與Mieszkowski（1986）為基礎，利用地方政府間之租稅競爭行為，結合租稅負擔與支出性質，探討地方公共財最適提供條件與資本稅歸宿條件。
    　租稅競爭行為通常只以課徵資本稅作為分析對象，但資本稅因存在扭曲性質，故政府提供之公共財數量必然低於最適水準。而本文引入政府提供不同類型公共財搭配課徵資本稅之觀點，利用要素彈性解釋地方公共財最適提供條件。本文發現在基本模型（僅考慮資本要素）中，消費性公共財提供數量會低於最適水準，生產性公共財則可能為提供不足或過度提供，主要原因取決於生產性公共財對生產動力之影響是否足以彌補資本稅帶來之扭曲性，而在延伸模型（同時考慮資本及勞動要素）中，消費性及生產性公共財雖仍提供不足，但消費性公共財較基本模型接近最適數量，而生產性公共財則較遠離最適數量。
    　　由於廠商及居民在租稅制度之機制下皆有可能承擔稅負，新觀點之歸宿理論認為課徵單一資本稅因不存在替代效果，故稅負全部由資本所有者承擔，而本文則以政府提供不同類型公共財之觀點，分析資本稅競爭環境之最後稅負承擔者，本文發現地方政府間租稅競爭行為會使資本稅發生轉嫁現象，且稅負由資本所有者及使用者共同承擔。
    當政府可透過支出政策，藉由提供吸引消費者遷入之消費性公共財或增加廠商生產動力之生產性公共財時，本文認為因公共支出成本係由使用之居民或廠商負擔，故資本稅具有使用者付費之受益性質。另本文發現在均衡時，於同轄區內定居之消費者及投資之廠商對政府公共支出品質與稅負具有相同偏好，此係政府、廠商與消費者運用自我選擇機制而使彼此間行為產生相互配合之現象，因而可滿足Tiebout模型強調之區分機制。
    Reference: 李顯峰與黃惠雯(1995)，「地方政府間租稅競爭與地方公共財供給之研究」，《中興大學財政所碩士論文》。
    楊宗翰(2002)，「人口移動、租稅競爭及所得重分配政策之研究」，《臺北大學財政所碩士論文》。
    劉其昌(1995)，《財政學》，臺北：五南。
    Aaron, Henry J. (1975), Who Pays the Property Tax:A New View, Washington:Brookings Institution.
    Bayindir-Upmann, T. (1998), “Two Games of Interjurisdictional Competition When Local Governments Provide Industrial Public Goods,” International Tax and Public Finance, 5, 471-487.
    Braid, Ralph M. (1996), “Symmetric Tax Competition with Multiple Jurisdictions in Each Metropolitan Area,” American Economics Review, 86, 1279-1290.
    Bucovetsky, S. (1991), “Asymmetric Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 167-181.
    Burbidge, John B. and Gordon M. Myers(1994), “Population Mobility and Capital Tax Competition,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 24, 441-459.
    Fisher, Ronald C. (1996), State and Local Public Finance, Chicago:Irwin.
    Haufler, Andreas (2001), Taxation in a Global Economy, New York:Cambridge University Press.
    Keen, Michael and Maurice Marchand (1997), “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 33-53.
    Matsumoto, Mutsumi (2000), “A Note on the Composition of Public Expenditure under Capital Tax Competition,” International Taxation and Public Finance, 7, 697-697.
    Oates, Wallace E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
    Rosen, Harvey S. (2005), Public Finance, New York:McGraw-Hill Irwin.
    Tannenwald, R. (2001), “Tax Competiton,” Encyclopedia of Taxation and Fiscal Policy, 433-436.
    Tiebout, Charles M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.
    Wildasin, David E. and John Douglas Wilson (1996), “Imperfect Mobility and Local Government Behaviour in an Overlapping-Generations Model,” “Journal of Public Economics, 60, 177-198.
    Wildasin, David E. (1989), “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility:Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy,” Journal of Urban Economics, 25, 193-212.
    Wilson, John Douglas (1999), “Theories of Tax Competition,” National Tax Journal, 52, 269-304.
    Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356-370.
    Zodrow, George R. (2001), “The Property Tax as a Capital Tax:A Room with Three Views,” National Tax Journal, 54, 139-156.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    93255015
    95
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255015
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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