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    題名: 外生的逃漏稅與最適出口貿易政策
    作者: 洪若雅
    貢獻者: 翁堃嵐
    洪若雅
    關鍵詞: 逃漏稅
    最適出口貿易政策
    成本差異
    廠商家數
    日期: 2005
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 10:57:00 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 傳統探討策略性出口貿易政策的文獻忽略了租稅以及租稅逃漏等議題對貿易政策的影響，因此本文主要的目的是探討當政府對廠商課利潤稅，且廠商可藉浮報成本的方式逃漏稅額的情況下，考慮逃漏稅問題對傳統貿易理論所造成的影響。本文第二章發現：在三國兩廠商的出口貿易模型下，最適的出口補貼率與浮報比例、利潤稅稅率呈負相關，所以最適的出口補貼率會較傳統結果低，當浮報比例或是利潤稅稅率相當高的時候，最適的出口貿易政策可能由出口補貼變為課徵出口稅；此外由於本國國內廠商僅有一家，最適的出口貿易政策即為第一優的政策，所以本國的社會福利並不受本國的利潤稅稅率及逃漏稅比例的影響。本文第三章發現：兩國間的最適出口補貼率差距決定於成本差異與租稅逃漏差異兩種效果，傳統低成本高補貼的結論應該視兩種效果的大小而定，特別當租稅逃漏差異效果相當大時，會讓成本較低的國家給予廠商較高的補貼，使得低成本高補貼的結論產生反轉。本文第四章將模型延伸到多家廠商的情況，文中發現：如果本國廠商家數比外國廠商家數多上大於一家的數量，則最適的出口政策仍為對廠商課徵出口稅，且稅率會比傳統的結果高；如果本國廠商的家數少於外國廠商家數加上一家的數量時，此時必須視租稅逃漏的效果大小而定，當租稅逃漏的效果相當大時，最適的出口政策將反轉為課徵出口稅。此外在多家廠商之下，由於利潤稅稅率與逃漏稅比例的增加，會使產業集中度降低，因而讓社會福利下降。
    參考文獻: 林燕淑、黃鴻 (1998),「最適出口補貼與空間競爭」，《經濟論文》，26(1)，1-18。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    93255003
    94
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093255003
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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