政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/34690

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/34690

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政大典藏 > College of Social Science > Department of Public Finance > Theses > Item 140.119/34690

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34690

Title:	政治獻金限額與關稅保護
Authors:	蔡坤良
Contributors:	王智賢蔡坤良
Keywords:	遊說政治獻金限額
Date:	2003
Issue Date:	2009-09-18 10:56:13 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	利益團體在影響政府制訂貿易政策上, 經常採取給予政治獻金的做法, 而政府為了增加繼續質性的機會, 也樂於接受利益團體的捐獻, 在政策上作某程度的偏袒與退讓。但因利益團體與政府的勾結可能會使全民福利的減損, 所以人民對於利益團體的行為常常以法令規章的形式來予以限制。本文以王智賢 (2001) 及 Wang, Koo and Chen (2003) 的模型構想為基礎, 加入政治獻金限額的考量, 探討面對政治獻金限額時利益團體的政治獻金及價格的提案如何改變, 以及社會福利是否真能獲得改善, 達到訂定政治獻金限額的目的。由本文的討論中發現, 當原先得標之部門所提的政治獻金較高時, 面對政治獻金限額的限制時, 無論是否會造成得標部門的逆轉, 都會有改善社會福利的情況。只有當原先得標之部門所提的政治獻金較低時, 也就是原先得標部門所提之價格能夠比原輸標之一方所提之價格帶來更高的福利時, 若出現原輸標的部門逆轉得標的情況, 社會福利不但可能無法獲得改善, 甚至有惡化的可能。至於對於原先得標之部門而言, 若能繼續使政府接受其提案, 則可能因獻金給予的減少而獲得更大的利潤。大體來說, 政治獻金限額的制定在一定程度上會減少政府對於政治獻金的收取能力, 確實有可能使社會福利增加。雖然現實上可能非如本文所認為的只有兩利益團體參與遊說, 但現實上相對立兩方向之團體組合的政治角力是常見且普遍的, 所以在真實社會上的情況應有相同的印證。
Reference:	王智賢 (2001), “遊說賽局與關稅保護”, 台灣大學經濟學系研究所博士論文。賴錦珖 (2003), 《公職人員選舉罷免法釋論》, 三民書局。 Aidt, Toke S. (1997), “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy,” Public Choice, 93(3-4), 455-475. Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Giovanni Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 89(5), 1135-1155. Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale,” American Economic Review, 84(4), 833-850. Hillman, Arye L. (1982), “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives,” American Economic Review, 72(5), 1180-1187. Hillman, Arye L. and Heinrich W. Ursprug (1988), “Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy,” American Economic Review, 78(4), 729-745. Ludema, Rodeny D. (2001), “Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection,” European Journal of Political Economy, 17(4), 817-833. Magee C. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-Rider Problem,” Journal of International Economics, 57(2), 449-471. Maggi, Giovanni and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998), “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(3), 574-601. Riezman, Raymond and John Douglas Wilson (1997), “Political Reform and Trade Policy,” Journal of International Economics, 42(1-2), 67-90. Stigler, George J. (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3-21. Wang, Jue-Shyan, Hui-wen Koo, and Tain-Jy Chen (2003), “Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby,” working paper.
Description:	碩士國立政治大學財政研究所 91255007 92
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255007
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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