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    題名: 貪瀆與經濟成長之分析
    作者: 王佳慧
    貢獻者: 黃明聖
    王佳慧
    關鍵詞: 貪瀆
    經濟成長
    貪腐印象指數
    日期: 2002
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 10:55:50 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 摘 要
    貪污在道德上會被嚴格批判，但貪污有助經濟成長，還是有害經濟成長？如果兩者的關係存在，貪瀆行為究竟是如何影響一國的經濟發展？此外，經濟發展程度與台灣相同的國家，其貪瀆程度與經濟發展之關係又為何？
    經濟文獻上，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為有助經濟成長，有些文獻認為貪瀆行為不利經濟成長，呈現兩極的說法。本研究從理論模型的探討，亦不能斷言貪瀆行為對經濟發展究竟是具有外部利益或是外部成本。但是貪瀆行為會影響經濟成長，卻是不爭的事實。
    本文以國際透明組織所調查的幾個國家資料，進行Panel及橫斷面實證分析得知：在低所得國家中，屬於高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.31美元。然而，在中低所得國家中，被歸類在高貪瀆程度者，其個人所得會較中貪瀆程度者低。在中高所得國家 (台灣被歸類在此類中)，低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者少0.24美元。在高所得國家中，屬於低貪瀆程度者，其個人所得較中貪瀆程度者多0.06美元。
    參考文獻: 參考文獻
    一、 中文部份
    章家敦, (2002),《中國即將崩潰》, 台北市：雅言文化。
    二、 英文部份
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    Bayley, D. H. (1966), “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation” Western Political Quarterly, 19(4), pp. 719-732.
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    Kaufmann, D. and S. J. Wei (1999), “Does Grease Money Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?” NBER Working Paper, No. 7093.
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    Krueger, A. O. (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 64, pp.291-303.
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    Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp.681-712.
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    Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1991), ”The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), pp.503-530.
    Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1993), ”Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, pp.409-414.
    Nye, J. S. (1967), “Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis”, American Political Science Review, 41(2), pp.567-572.
    Rasmusen, E. and J. M. Ramseyer (1994), “Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: a Coordination Game among Rational Legislators,” Public Choice, 78, pp.305-327.
    Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975), “The Economics of Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, 4, pp.187-203.
    Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993), “Corruption,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), pp.599-618.
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    Wei, S. J. (1997), “How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?” NBER Working Paper, No. 6030.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    90255026
    91
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255026
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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