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    题名: 相互性對公共財實驗中合作行為的影響
    作者: 黃裕舜
    贡献者: 徐麗振
    黃裕舜
    关键词: 相互性
    公共財實驗
    日期: 2002
    上传时间: 2009-09-18 10:54:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在公共財實驗中，受試者決策行為存在著「相互性」的考量是用來解釋受試者出現合作行為的原因之一。本篇研究以三人一組的實驗驗證受試者確有相互性之考量。受試者欲以較高的貢獻去「回報」同組成員的高貢獻，而受試者亦欲以較低的貢獻去「報復」同組成員的低貢獻。此外，當受試者同時面對的組員有著兩種截然不同的貢獻態度時，受試者的「相互性」卻並非是正負中和而完全抵銷，受試者行為會受兩股相反方向力量的影響而顯得變動較為劇烈，且受試者傾向有較深的報復情緒，這樣的情緒會凌駕互助的情緒而影響受試者的決策。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    90255003
    91
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090255003
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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