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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34270


    Title: 負債、代理問題與審計公費關聯性之探討
    Authors: 黃勝平
    Huang,Sheng Ping
    Contributors: 陳錦烽
    黃勝平
    Huang,Sheng Ping
    Keywords: 代理問題
    審計公費
    負債
    公司治理
    agency problem
    audit fee
    debt
    corporate governance
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 09:11:44 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？
    本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。
    Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not?
    Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.
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    三、網站資料
    世界銀行網站：http://www.worldbank.org
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    92353020
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923530201
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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