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| Title: | 獨立董監制度與關係人交易關係之研究 |
| Authors: | 張正源
Chang, Cheng-yuan |
| Contributors: | 林美花
Lin, Mei-Hwa
張正源
Chang, Cheng-yuan |
| Keywords: | 關係人交易
獨立董事
獨立董監制度
Related party transaction
independent director
The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors |
| Date: | 2004 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 09:11:00 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。
台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下：
1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。
2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。
3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。
4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。
基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。
The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members.
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows,
1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising.
2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction.
3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance.
4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out.
In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
91353017
93 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913530171 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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