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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34227
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34227


    Title: 董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究
    Authors: 宋致皓
    Contributors: 林宛瑩
    宋致皓
    Keywords: 董監酬勞
    權益性報酬
    高階主管權力
    機構投資人
    家族企業
    compensation of board of director
    equity-based compensation
    managerial power
    institutional investor
    family-controlled firms
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 09:03:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳,董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素,並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。

    實證結果顯示,董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞,尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分,且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面,獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯;在外部監督機制方面,主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人,具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。
    Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity.

    The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders" equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    93353027
    94
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093353027
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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