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| Title: | 非營利組織融資行為之研究-以私立大專院校為例 |
| Authors: | 蔡依縈 |
| Contributors: | 許崇源
蔡依縈 |
| Keywords: | 非營利組織
融資行為
資本結構理論 |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 |
| Abstract: | 時至今日，非營利組織發展越來越成熟，對於社會的影響也越來越深遠。但是，各類非營利組織通常本身並無足夠自主財源藉以支持整個事業的運作和發展，故仍必須向政府、私人企業及一般社會大眾進行融資的工作，才能維持其長期性和計畫性的社會改善行動。
在過去十幾年間，非營利組織逐漸向私部門汲取經驗，以試圖改善其組織運作之效果及效率；特別是在策略規劃、行銷、融資、資訊系統以及組織發展等領域上。但就目前國內的文獻而言，其多著重於非營利組織之策略規劃以及績效評估之研究，對於非營利組織之資本結構和融資決策之研究則鮮少著墨。
因此，本研究乃根據兩大組織資本結構理論：融資順位理論（The Pecking Order Theory）以及最適資本結構靜態抵換理論（The Static Trade-Off Theory）之假設，試著以國內非營利組織之相關資料，進一步探討國內非營利組織之管理階層融資決策過程，以及組織所取得的補助款多寡，是否會影響非營利組織之管理階層之融資決策。
因國立大專院校並無融資行為，本研究所研究之非營利組織標的，以國內之私立大專院校為限；本研究之實證結果發現，當私立大專院校之盈餘波動越大時，比較不願意向外融資；代表私立大專院校在盈餘不穩定時，不會利用融資的方式取得資金，以免盈餘較大的波動性增加了拖欠成本的可能性，而進一步影響到學校整體穩健的營運。
另外，私立大專院校之實證結果未支持任何財務理論，可能原因在於私立大專院校在從事融資活動時，未有任何之借款偏好。至於就補助款比率而言，實證結果符合假說預期，代表當私立大專院校所取得之補助款越多時；亦即有較穩定之資金管道時，越不會對外融資；另外，針對利息補助款比率來說，實證結果發現，當私立大專院校取得之利息補助款越多時，並不會提高其對外取得融資的意願。就敘述性統計量來看，平均而言，私立大專院校對外借款仍須負擔約七成的利息費用，因此，教育部之利息補助並沒有大幅降低學校的負擔，所以，縱使有利息補助的措施，亦未顯著影響學校向外取得更多資金之意願。
綜上所述，當私立大專院校之盈餘波動性越高時、補助款越多時，其對外融資的傾向會降低；至於，利息補助則因教育部所提供之補助金額有限，所以，私立大專院校並不會因取得較高的利息補助款金額，而增加對外籌資的機會。
Nonprofit Organization (NPO) has well developed and has great impact on the society. NPO may not have enough funds to support its long-term social improvement plans, so it has to borrow money from government, financial intermediary, or others.
NPO have learnt many from the other sectors to get the organization more effectively and efficiently in the past years, especially about strategy planning, marketing, financing, information system and organization development. Unlike most of domestic studies that focus on the strategy planning and performance evaluation, the study focuses on the issue of capital structure and finance decision. According to organization capital structure theory, this study uses domestic NPO’s data to analyze finance decision and examines how subventions influence university’s finance decision.
Because national universities have no bank liability, so the study focuses on the financial behavior of private universities. The empirical result shows that the greater the earnings fluctuated, the fewer the private university lent. In addition, the financing behavior of the private university doesn’t support any capital structure theory. It may mean that the private university management has no financing preference. When the private university obtains more subventions, the management doesn`t borrow more because it has steady fund resource. When the private university obtains more subventions on interest expense, the management doesn’t borrow more. This result doesn’t support the assumption. Perhaps the subventions on interest expense don’t alleviate the burden of interest expense substantially. |
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教育部資訊網：http://www.edu.tw
教育部私立大學校院整體發展獎助及補助作業：http://moe.cycu.edu.tw/moe2002/index.asp
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
90353041
91 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090353041 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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