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| Title: | 管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例關係：企業研發支出之實證研究 |
| Authors: | 林鼎堯 |
| Contributors: | 李怡宗
林鼎堯 |
| Keywords: | 管理當局短視
機構投資人持股比例
盈餘管理
公司治理
management myopic
ownership of institutional investor
earning management
corporation governance |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 |
| Abstract: | 現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。
本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。
實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。
Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance.
This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly.
The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
90353040
91 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090353040 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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