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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34190


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    題名: 董事身份特性與董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度關係之研究
    作者: 李亭誼
    貢獻者: 馬秀如
    李亭誼
    關鍵詞: 非財務資訊
    背景能力資訊
    薪資酬勞資訊
    資訊揭露
    董事特性
    日期: 2002
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18
    摘要: 企業須揭露的資訊，並不以財務資訊，甚至營運資訊為已足。美國標準普爾公司所做的公司透明度與揭露調查，不僅包括財務資訊，也注重非財務資訊。這些非財務資訊包括所有權之結構及與投資者之關係，以及董事會結構與運作過程二類資訊。OECD建議，企業至少應揭露七項資訊中，有一項為「董事會成員及主要經營階層，及其報酬」，可見「董監經理人相關資訊」的重要性，不亞於財務資訊與營運資訊。但我國企業所揭露的非財務資訊，常有不足，且國際評等機構對我國企業資訊揭露的評價亦不高。
    本研究認為，若能掌握影響企業董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度之因素，將有助於我國企業透明度之提升。在我國公司法制的設計下，企業資訊之揭露係由董事會負責，然董事會是否重視資訊揭露，可能與其成員之身份特性有關。因此，本研究欲檢視董事成員身份特性因素是否是影響董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度的重要因素。
    本研究為我國首次關注企業非財務、營運資訊之揭露，所關心的資訊包括董監經理人之背景能力與薪資酬勞二類資訊。資訊揭露程度之衡量，係將樣本公司年報、財務報告中相關揭露內容，與本研究自行設計的揭露索引表之揭露項目逐一比對，並考慮資訊揭露詳細程度之差異，進行項目評分，再加總得出一揭露總分之方式。提出探討的董事身份特性變數包括家族董監事、法人機構董監事、法人股東是否同時選任為董事與監察人、獨立董監事，以及董事長是否兼任總經理等五項。
    研究樣本為民國90年度已在台灣證交所上市之公司，排除金融保險業、官方色彩濃厚公司、判斷資料不全公司後，共計樣本數426家。實證結果顯示非關係法人董監事席次比例、獨立董監事席次比例與資訊揭露程度呈正向顯著關係，表示二者之監督，有助於提升企業資訊揭露程度。法人股東同時選任為董事與監察人時，資訊揭露程度較低，可見此情形有削弱企業監管機制，有礙資訊揭露的傾向。但家族董監事席次比例、董事長是否兼任總經理二變數，則與資訊揭露程度間未發現顯著關係。
    The information that enterprises should disclose is not limited to financial and operating information. The “Company Transparency and Disclosure Survey” by Standard & Poor’s not only includes financial information, but also focuses on nonfinancial information, including ownership structure and investor relations, and board structure and process. OECD suggests enterprises at least disclose seven kinds of material information, and one of them is “ members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration.” Thus it could reveal that “the information related to board and executives” is no less important than financial and operating information. But in our country enterprises disclosure level in nonfinancial information is not enough. Besides, national evaluation institutions set a low value on information disclosure level of our country’s enterprises.
    This study presumes that if we can control the influential factor of the disclosure level about information related to board and executives, it will help to enhance enterprises’ transparency in our country. In our country’s Company Law system, board is responsible for the information disclosure of enterprises. We surmise whether board emphasizes on information disclosure has relationship with characteristics of directors’ identities. So the study wants to examine if the characteristics of directors’ identities are the important factors influencing the disclosure level of the information about board and executives.
    This is the very first study in our country to focus the information disclosure on nonfinancial and nonoperating information, that related to background and remuneration of board and executives. The way to measure the disclosure level is that the study designs a disclosure checklist to examine if these disclosure items appear on sample enterprises’ information disclosure of annual report and financial report, and also scrutinize to what extent the disclosure detail of information reaches. Finally the study gives each item a point, and sums up a total grade. The study has five directors’ identities characteristics variables, including family directors, institutional directors, whether institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, independent directors, and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously.
    The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2001, but exclude banking and insurance industry, and government-involved companies or companies with insufficient judging information are excluded. The rest amount to 426 samples. The empirical result indicates that the proportion of nonrelated institutional directors and independent directors on board are positively related to the extent of information disclosure. If a company has an institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, it has lower extent of information disclosure. The proportion of family directors on the board and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously reveal no significant relationship with the extent of information disclosure.
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