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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34076


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34076


    Title: 內部人參與投資母公司轉投資事業之研究
    An Empirical Analysis of Co-investment Between the Insiders and Parents in Subsidiaries
    Authors: 陳美菁
    Chen, Mei-ching
    Contributors: 周行一
    Chow, Edward H.
    陳美菁
    Chen, Mei-ching
    Keywords: 內部人
    轉投資事業
    母公司
    參與投資
    Insider
    subsidiary
    parent corporation
    co-investment
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-17 19:22:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 台灣上市公司為了轉型、多角化及提升競爭力等需求，經常轉投資於其他事業體，不同於其他歐美國家，台灣母公司通常未持有轉投資公司全數股權，而且經常有一部份股權是由母公司董監事、高階經理人及大股東等內部人所持有，此即本論文研究主題—內部人參與投資母公司轉投資事業。由於資訊不對稱下存在的代理問題，內部的參與投資母公司轉投資事業又改變了內部人報酬來源之結構，內部人動機及行為可能因而改變，進而影響轉投資績效及母公司價值。內部人參與投資母公司轉投資事業理論上有其重要性，但目前文獻尚未對此一現象之成因及影響進行探討，因此本論文針對內部人參與投資課題進行研究。
    本論文取樣自台灣證券交易所在2001年底以前上市的74家各產業大型公司，藉由假說建構及變數的設計，以內部人參與投資為中心，本論文包含了三個研究課題，第一個課題關於轉投資事業間內部人參與投資差異性之成因；第二個課題是關於不同公司間內部人參與投資程度差異性之成因；第三個課題是檢視內部人參與投資對公司價值的影響。
    在第一個課題轉投資業間內部人參與投資差異性成因方面，實證結果發現：母公司對轉投資事業持股比例愈高，參與投資比例愈低，支持「股權結構替代性假說」。對多數樣本而言，內部人對於有兼職的轉投資事業有較高的參與投資程度，支持「激勵機制假說」。內部人較傾向於參與投資與母公司經營無關行業的轉投資事業，支持「內部人投資多角化假說」。而「利益輸送因應假說」、「擇優投資假說」以及「內部人財務限制假説」並未受實證結果支持，可能代表對利益輸送效果之因應、追求具良好報酬特質的投資標的以及對自身財務限制之考量，並非內部人參與投資決策時的主要考量因素。
    在第二個課題公司間內部人參與投資差異性之成因方面，實證結果發現，內部人參與投資會隨負債比例及轉投資組合比例而增加，表示內部人參與投資可能是為了解決母公司轉投資時資金來源的問題，支持「解決母公司財務限制假說」。而參與投資也會隨內部人兼職轉投資組合程度而增加，符合「激勵機制假說」之預期。內部人會因轉投資組合與母公司之間的契約交易關係密切，而增加其相對參與投資比例，符合「利益輸出因應假說」之預期。內部人參與投資比例平均值與母公司對轉投資事業持股比例平均值，呈顯著負向關係，支持「股權結構替代性假說」。而不論是轉投資組合規模、母公司規模或是局部轉投資組合相對規模，都對參與投資程度有顯著正向影響。未能受到本部份實證支持的假說包括「擇優投資假說」、「內部人投資多角化假說」、「直間接投資替代性假說」、以及「控制權補強假說」。
    在第三個課題參與投資對公司價值的影響方面，實證結果發現參與投資比例中位數對轉投資組合報酬率有正向影響，支持「激勵誘因假說」，可以推論參與投資的激勵誘因效果，主要是來自於投資對象較為普遍，而不集中於少數轉投資事業的參與投資型態。除了少數分類樣本外，並未發現支持「內部人自利選擇假說」的直接證據。
    在內部人控制權力集中以及家族控制公司，參與投資對公司價值的影響不論正負，都更為顯著；這可能是因為內部人參與投資最主要是透過影響內部人動機而影響母公司價值，由於這類公司的內部人比較能主導公司決策及營運，故內部人動機改變造成的效果會愈為顯著，造成了內部人參與投資對母公司價值有較為顯著的關聯性。而市場對於電子業內部人的參與投資評價似乎特別正向，可能是因為市場將內部人參與投資解讀為其對公司轉投資事業的認同。
    The large corporations in Taiwan often invest in other firms, namely the parent corporations own equity stakes of their subsidiaries. Interestingly, the insiders of parent corporations (including the directors, supervisors, senior managers and large shareholders of parent corporations) also frequently invest in these subsidiaries at the same time. I name this phenomenon co-investment. With the sample of 74 largest TSE-listed corporations of 17 industries, this empirical paper tries to investigate the causes and impacts of co-investment.
    The empirical results show that the degree of co-investment is negatively related to the equity stake hold by the parent corporations. The co-investment seems be used as an incentive mechanism, which can encourage insiders to improve the performance of subsidiaries. Insiders co-invest in those business-unrelated subsidiaries more likely, which is consistent with the “diversification hypothesis”. Those parent corporations with more transaction-related subsidiaries (TRS) have higher degree of co-investment, which implies that insiders may take the benefits of tunneling by increase their equity stakes of TRS. There are also some empirical results support that insiders co-invest in subsidiaries to finance the investment need of parents corporations.
    Although co-investment may reform the return source of insiders and theoretically deteriorate the incentives of insiders, however, this paper finds no strong evidence that co-investment would do harm to the value of parents corporations. One special type of co-investment may increase the performance of subsidiary portfolio and the value of parent corporations.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    87357502
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0873575021
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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