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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34034
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34034


    Title: 公司管理階層多角化動機之探討
    Authors: 許春蕙
    Contributors: 屠美亞教授
    許春蕙
    Keywords: 代理問題
    公司績效
    股權結構
    多角化
    Date: 2002
    Issue Date: 2009-09-17 19:10:53 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去幾年學術界發現,多角化經營會減損公司績效,此結果有別於早期之實證研究。在此情況下,為何高階主管會進行多角化經營?其多角化動機為何?本研究於是從代理理論觀點,參考Aggarwal and Samwick(2003)之模型,探討主導公司管理階層多角化之動機。與過去研究最大之不同處在於:本文在推論過程中,同時納入代理理論兩個不同觀點-趨避風險及滿足私人利益,藉由控制多角化程度之變動,觀察高階主管誘因契約與公司績效連結性強弱,以此推論隱含之高階管理者多角化動機。
    本研究認為:若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現負相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越強,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為趨避風險;反之,若高階主管持股比率與多角化程度呈現正相關,同時在多角化程度變動下,高階主管持股比率與公司績效之連結性越弱,則主導高階主管多角化之動機為滿足私人利益。本研究以高階主管持股比率替代高階主管誘因契約,以Entropy指標衡量公司多角化程度,以Tobin’s Q衡量公司績效,在實證時,又將高階主管細分為經營團隊與董事長兩組。
    實證結果顯示:在經營團隊組,並無明顯證據顯示其多角化動機由和因素所主導,可能原因為台灣公司家族企業比重高,使專業經理人難以進入權力核心,左右多角化決策,使得實證結果並不顯著;在董事長組,則明顯指出,其多角化動機為趨避風險。換句話說,由於董事長個人財富、職位及聲譽與公司績效關連性很大,因此希望藉由多角化經營降低本身暴露之非系統風險。本研究同時發現,在此情況下,董事長私人利益與公司利益較無衝突,使多角化經營造成公司績效減損之幅度較小。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    90357013
    91
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090357013
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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