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    題名: 理性選擇理論與國際安全研究
    作者: 宋蕙吟
    Sung,Hui-Yin
    貢獻者: 姜家雄
    宋蕙吟
    Sung,Hui-Yin
    關鍵詞: 理性選擇理論
    國際安全研究
    賽局理論
    嚇阻理論
    展望理論
    日期: 2003
    上傳時間: 2009-09-17 17:51:59 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 理性選擇理論是第二次世界大戰後國際關係研究一個主要的研究途徑，在當代國際關係理論的爭辯中扮演了概念釐清的角色，並且增進了對無政府狀態內涵與國際合作可能性的理解。國際安全研究中，理性選擇以嚇阻理論為主要研究議題，針對核武嚇阻、傳統武器嚇阻、流氓國家與恐怖份子嚇阻等重要議題，無論是理論建構或實證研究皆有豐富的研究成果。在1980年代，形式化(formal))的理性選擇作為一種國際關係研究途徑成為一時顯學，與傳統國際關係主要研究途徑如歷史分析、文化研究、政治心理學等並駕齊驅，甚或有超越之勢；直至1990年代末期，理性選擇面臨強烈的質疑，進而引發了批評者與辯護者對於理性假設與方法論的爭辯。值得注意的是，自1990年以來，認知科學中的「展望理論」開始跨足至國際關係研究，試圖從行為者如何處理與詮釋訊息的角度來解釋國際政治行為與結果，對理性選擇的假設作了些許修正與補充，兩者的在未來的結合將有助於國際關係研究的發展。
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    （三）博碩士論文
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    （五）、研究報告
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    （六）、報章雜誌
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    Cohn, Jonathan. “When Did Political Science Forget about Politics? Irrational Exuberance.” The New Republic, October 25, 1999, 25-31.
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