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    题名: 賣方拍賣策略分析:評價效果
    A Dynamic Analysis of Auction with Reputation Effects
    作者: 黃久晏
    Huang,Chiu Yen
    贡献者: 莊委桐
    Juang, Wei Torng
    黃久晏
    Huang,Chiu Yen
    关键词: 網路拍賣
    評價
    定價策略
    AUCTIONS
    REPUTATION
    PRICING STRATEGY
    日期: 2006
    上传时间: 2009-09-14 13:28:46 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 過去認為賣家評價對於價格是正、統計上顯著地影響價格，但是這影響卻不大，我們建立一個模型去解釋是兩種正負關係互相抵消，造成觀察到的結果是很小的情況。具體的說，賣家需要高評價分數去銷售高單價商品，而累積評價分數快速又低成本的方法就是利用低單價商品，利用降低低單價商品價格，讓銷售量增加的更快，銷售量增加快，評價就會增加快速。所以評價對於低價商品是一種負的關係，對於高單價商品才是正的關係。
    It has been recognized empirically that in internet auctions, seller`s reputation has a positive, statistically significant, but small impact on the price. We construct a model on internet auctions and delineate this small impact with two opposite forces. To be specific, it needs higher reputation for sellers to sell high-price goods and a cheap way to achieve this objective is to lower the price of low-price goods. By this way one can raise the sale volume of low-price commodities to increase reputation score quickly, which benefits the sale of high-price goods. Therefore, reputation imposes positive impact on prices of "expensive" goods and negative impact on prices of "cheap" ones.
    參考文獻: [1]Anderson, S., Friedman, D., Milam, G., and Singh, N. (2004), "Seller Strategies on eBay" UCSC Working paper.
    [2]Budish, E.B. and Takeyama L.N. (2001), "Buy Price in Online Auctions: Irrationality on the Internet?" Economics Letters, 72, 325-33.
    [3]Houser, D and Wooders, J.(2005), "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay" University of Arizona Working paper.
    [4]Kirkegaard, R. and Overgaard, P.B.(2007), "Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand," Brock University, Canada Working paper.
    [5]Livingson, J.A. (2005), "How Valuable is a Good Reputation? A Simple Selection Model of Internet Auctions," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 453-65.
    [6]Mathews, T. (2004), "The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-out Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay`s But-It-Now Feature," Journal of Economics, 81, 25-52.
    [7]Mathews, T. and B. Katzman (2006), "The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option," Economic Theory, 27, 597-613.
    [8]Melnik, M. and Alm, J. (2002), "Does A Seller`s Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, 337-349.
    [9]Shapiro, C. (1983), "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659-680.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟研究所
    94258008
    95
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094258008
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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