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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/31243


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    題名: 公司治理對企業基本財務資訊與股利政策的影響-內生性轉換模型的應用
    作者: 林昆立
    貢獻者: 沈中華
    林昆立
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    基本財務資訊
    股利政策
    內生性轉換模型
    縱橫門檻模型
    日期: 2007
    上傳時間: 2009-09-14 09:35:48 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文主要包含二個主題，分別檢視公司治理對企業基本財務資訊與股票報酬關係的影響，以及公司治理對企業投資機會與股利政策關係的影響。首先，在探討公司治理是否影響基本財務資訊中，我們資料為台灣上市的 183 家製造業公司。當使用傳統線性模型時，我們發現存貨、銷貨毛利、備抵壞帳費用以及負債比率變化率的係數，出現符合預期的負向符號。但是研發費、管銷費用與員工生產力比率的係數，卻出現違反直覺的正向符號。而每股盈餘變化率、應收帳款、有效稅率以及會計師意見，則是對股票報酬沒有任何顯著的效果。然而，我們使用 Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) 內生性轉換模型(endogenous switching model, ESM) 的方法，而將樣本區分為好的公司治理與不好的公司治理二個區域時，實證結果發現先前違反直覺的係數，已轉變成與我們的預期相符合。
    在探討公司治理是否影響企業投資機會與股利政策關係，我們資料為台灣上市的 268 家製造業公司，並參考La Porta et al. (2000) 所提出的「結果模型假說」 (outcome model hypotheses) 以及「替代模型假說」(substitution model hypotheses) 兩個假設。前者強調在好的公司治理區域時，投資機會與股利政策為負向的關係，而後者則是強調在不好的公司治理區域，投資機會與股利政策為正向的關係。為了探討這個議題，我們分別使用兩個轉換模型區分樣本：分別為Hansen (1999) 縱橫門檻模型 (panel threshold model) 以及Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) 內生性轉換模型。最後，經由不同公司治理變數的實證結果比較，發現在好公司治理區域時，高投資機會的公司可能會支付較少的股利政策，相反地，在不好的公司治理區域，股利政策則不受到公司治理的影響。因此本研究結果支持「結果模型假說」，而不是「替代模型假說」的假設。
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
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    96
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