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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/31006
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/31006


    Title: 公司治理和企業併購的超額報酬之關聯性研究
    Study of the relationship between corporate governance and the abnormal return of M&A
    Authors: 林慶哲
    Lin,Ching Che
    Contributors: 吳啟銘
    Wu, Chiming
    林慶哲
    Lin,Ching Che
    Keywords: 併購
    公司治理
    經理人持股比例
    大股東持股比例
    獨立董事
    董事會規模
    市值規模
    M@A
    Corporate Governance
    Independent Directors
    Board of Directors
    Market Value
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2009-09-14 09:02:53 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 隨著國內外相關弊案的爆發,「公司治理」近幾年來一直是企業相當重視的議題。除了由於受到國際環境變化劇烈所影響之外,公司治理也與整體企業監控制度有密切之關聯。在國內外有相當多的學者從不同角度進行公司治理的相關的研究,而主管機關如金管會、證交所等也陸續制定相關的措施,希望能夠盡最大的力量來保障投資人的權益。

    本研究主要是藉由公司治理的主要變數來探討企業購併案所造成的超額報酬與公司治理之間的影響,並進一步討論當公司治理愈差時,宣告購併所產生的超額報酬是否會較低。研究期間為民國87年1月至97年3月間,曾發生併購活動的上市、櫃公司,共選取100個樣本。而實證結果如下:

    一. 經理人持股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
    二. 大股東股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
    三. 獨立董事占董事會的比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
    四. 董事會的規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
    五. 市值規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈現正相關,但不顯著

    另外,本研究也針對公司治理較差的公司去進行研究分析,發現若公司治理較差的公司去從事購併案時,可賺取的超額報酬愈少,而當公司治理愈差時,這種關係將愈顯著。最後,本研究也彙整一些相關建議,以供後續學者、企業以及政府機關做參考。
    As scandals related to managers and the wealth of investors spring up worldwide, corporate governance has become an important issue recently. In addition to drastic international macroeconomics changes, corporate governance is also strongly influenced by overall monitor systems. Scholars around the world have done lots of research regarding corporate governance for decades. In addition, relevant efforts and measures, aimed at protecting investors’ rights and interests, have also been done by authorities such as FSC and TSE.

    The purpose of the study is to study the relationship between abnormal return of M&A and corporate governance by examining the factors we choose. Furthermore, we discuss if a company performs poorly on its corporate governance system, whether the abnormal return caused by merger deals will also decrease? 100 samples were selected from the listed companies from TSE and OTC between 1998~2008. Main findings include the following:

    (1). The ratio of the stock held by managers has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
    (2). The ratio of the stock held by major stockholders has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
    (3). The ratio of the outside independent directors has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
    (4). The scale of the board has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
    (5). The market value has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A

    Moreover, the study has also done some empirical research on companies whose corporate governance pale in comparison with others and found that those who do poorly on corporate governance tend to make less abnormal return when making acquisition announcements. Last but not least, the study has also made some suggestions for scholars, businesses and government and hope that they may come in handy in the future.
    Reference: 一、中文部份
    1. 吳昆皇(民84年),「上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營之關聯性研究」,國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文
    2. 孫秀蘭(民85年),「董事會制度與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文
    3. 黃鈺光(民82年),「我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文
    4. 侍台誠(民83年),「董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究-兼論法人董事的影響」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文
    5. 王玉珍(民91年),「股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
    6. 劉靜容(民91年),「經理者股權與公司績效-內生轉換聯立方程模型分析」,淡江大學經濟研究所碩士論文
    7. 張明峰(民80年),「股權結構對公司績效影響之研究」,國立政治大學企管所碩士論文
    8. 江雅雲(民88年),「我國上市公司董監事改選機制與其經營績效之關聯性研究」,國立政治大學會計系碩士論文
    9. 楊麗弘(民88年),「台灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效研究」,私立長庚大學管理研究所碩士論文
    10. 林玉霞(民91年),「台灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值研究」,私立中原大學會計研究所碩士論文
    11. 柯承恩(民89年),「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)」,會計研究月刊,第173期,頁75-81
    12. 柯承恩(民89年),「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)」,會計研究月刊,第174期,頁79-83
    13. 陳春山(民75年),「機構投資人與證券市場,證券管理」,第四卷第二期,頁30-40
    14. 劉韻僖、葉匡時(民國88年),「強化國內經濟體質:企業監控之研究,經濟情勢暨評論」,第五卷第一期,頁1-22
    15. 葉銀華及邱顯比(民85年),「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論」,台大管理論叢,第七卷第二期,頁57-90
    16. 葉銀華、李存修及柯承恩(民89年),「公司治理與評等系統」,台北:商智文化
    17. 王元章(民90年),「內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值」,證券市場發展,第十三卷第三期
    18. 蘇裕惠、葉銀華(民88年),「強化公司治理機制之探討」,主計月報第521期,第八十七卷第五期,頁13-25
    19. 公開資訊觀測站,http://mops.tse.com.tw
    20. 台灣證券交易所,http://www.tse.com.tw
    二、英文部份
    1. Fama, E. (1980), Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political
    Economy, 88, 288-307
    1. Fama, E&Jensen, M. (1983), Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325
    2. Barnhart, S. W., & Rosenstein, S. (1998). Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance:An empirical analysis, Financial Review, 22, 1-16
    3. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure , Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360
    4. Core, J., Holthausen, R., & Larcker, D. (1999), Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406
    5. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.(1990), Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?Journal of Finance, 45, 31-48
    6. Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J. (1990), Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Finance, 26, 175-192
    7. Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J. (1997), Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Finance, 44, 229-250
    8. Ueng, J (1998), Manager incentive and returns to shareholders of acquiring firms, Review of Business, 19, 27-30
    9. Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. II. (1989), Board of directors and corporate financial performance:A review and integrated model, Journal of Management, 15, 291-334
    10. World Bank (199), Corporate governance:A framework for implementation-overview, The World Bank, Washington D.C
    11. Kesner, I. F., & Johnson, R. B.(1990), An investigation of the relationship between board composition and stockholder suits, Strategic Management Journal, 11, 327-336
    12. Magal, R. & H. Singh, (1993), Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporation, Accounting and Business Research, 23, 339-350
    13. McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes (1990), Additional evidence in equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612
    14. Jensen, M & Murphy, K. (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 225-264
    15. Yermack, D. (1996), Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211
    16. Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Raman, K. (2001), Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions, Journal of Finance, 56, 2299-2336
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    95357016
    96
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095357016
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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