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    题名: 產業專家、會計師任期與盈餘管理關聯性之實證研究
    作者: 吳品慧
    贡献者: 郭弘卿
    吳品慧
    关键词: 產業專家
    會計師任期
    裁決性應計數
    盈餘管理
    Industry specialization
    Auditor tenure
    Discretionary accruals
    Earnings management
    日期: 2004
    上传时间: 2009-09-11 17:36:26 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以我國1994年至2003年由四大會計師事務所查核簽證之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，探討會計師之產業專精與任期及其交互作用對於查核品質之影響，其中以裁決性應計數作為查核品質之代理變數，並同時採用會計師事務所及合夥會計師在特定產業之市場佔有率，作為產業專家之衡量指標。實證結果發現，產業專家可以限制受查客戶透過裁決性應計數從事盈餘管理，而以合夥會計師為基礎所計算之市場佔有率較會計師事務所為基礎所計算之市場佔有率，更能解釋審計品質的差異。在任期方面，研究結果顯示，會計師任期愈長愈能限制盈餘管理，而任期對於裁決性應計數絕對値之影響係反映於任期較長會計師之查核年資。但進一步檢測會計師對管理當局操弄盈餘向上或向下的態度是否隨著任期之增長而有所不同時，本研究發現，當管理當局操弄盈餘使其降低時，會計師任期增長愈能抑制管理當局向下操弄盈餘以預留未來盈餘空間；而在管理當局操弄盈餘使其增加時，會計師任期增長則沒有理由支持具查核品質。此外，在產業專家與任期之交互作用對查核品質影響方面，實證結果發現，產業專家會計師抑制盈餘管理的能力較非產業專家好，所以較不須要透過任期的增加來提升其偵測盈餘管理的能力。
    This study uses the sample comprised of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 1994-2003 and examines the effects of auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure and the interaction on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as proxies for audit quality and industry specialization is measured in terms of both audit firm market share in an industry and auditor market share in an industry. My empirical results provide evidence that industry specialist auditors can restrict accruals-based earnings management and explain the differentiation of audit quality more than industry specialist audit firms. About auditor tenure, I find that absolute discretionary accruals decline with auditor tenure and tenure traced at the longer auditor tenure is superior to shorter auditor tenure. The results show that longer auditor tenure enhances audit quality. In addition, a further analysis shows that the clients have motivations on income-decreasing earnings management, auditors can limit management’s ability to create reserve to manage future earnings. But the clients have motivations on income-increasing earnings management, the study did not provide sufficient evidences to explain that audit quality is improved with tenure. Besides, the result of empirical analysis support my estimation about the interaction between auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. The industry specialist auditors mitigate earnings management more than nonspecialist auditors and don’t enhance audit quality through extending auditor tenure.
    參考文獻: 一、中文部分
    台灣證券交易所股份有限公司審閱上市公司財務報告作業程序
    吳元富，2003，會計師任期與財務預測誤差，國立臺灣大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    李建然及陳政芳，2004，審計客戶重要性與盈餘管理：以五大事務所組別為觀察標的，會計評論，第38期：59-80。
    李建然及林秀鳳，2004，會計師任期與異常應計數之關聯性研究，會計理論與實務研討會
    范宏書及陳慶隆，2004，會計師任期與盈餘品質之關係，會計理論與實務研討會
    財團法人中華民國證券櫃檯買賣中心審閱上櫃公司財務報告作業程序
    會計師辦理公開發行公司財務報告查核簽證核准準則
    二、英文部分
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    92353009
    93
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923530091
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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