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    Title: 政府機構持股與公司經營績效關聯性之研究
    Authors: 黃燕瑜
    Yen Yu,Huang
    Contributors: 林宛瑩
    黃燕瑜
    Yen Yu,Huang
    Keywords: 政府持股
    公司治理
    經營績效
    Government shareholding
    Corporate governance
    Firm performance
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2009-09-11 17:27:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以2001年至2005年為研究期間，從股權結構及董事會監督功能分別探討公股角色對投資標的公司經營績效之影響。本文之研究結果顯示：(1)股權結構變數中，公股投資標的公司之經營績效較無公股投資之公司為佳。(2)公股持股比率愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效則愈差。(3)董事會組成變數中，由公股代表出任董監之公股投資標的公司之經營績效較未派任公股代表之公司為佳。(4)當公股代表的席次比率愈高時，公股之投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。(5)公股持股比率偏離公股代表席次比率之程度愈高，公股投資標的公司之經營績效愈差。
    This research from 2001 to 2005 as research period, aim to explore the role of government ownership in the relationship between board composition and firm performance in the enterprises with government ownership. The empirical results document that from ownership structure variables, the effect of government shareholding on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance decreases with an increased size of government shareholding. From board composition variables, the effect of the board with the government shareholding represents on firm performance is found to be positive. Furthermore, firm performance is worse with an increased size of government shareholding represents in the corporate board composition. Finally, when the government shareholding and the government shareholding represents’ seat ratio deviation degree is bigger, the firm performance would be worse.
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